The Nature and Drivers of Radicalisation in Australia

Submission to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security

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Overview

1. Radicalisation relating to terrorism and violence in Australia presents significant public safety challenges. Safety is a human right. Governments have human rights obligations to protect public safety.
2. Governments also have obligations to protect other relevant human rights including the right to equality and non-discrimination, the right to privacy and the requirement that the best interest of the child must be a primary consideration. Protecting these human rights in responses to radicalisation is essential and will strengthen efforts to protect public safety.
3. Efforts to strengthen equality, participation, social inclusion and community trust can reduce vulnerability to radicalisation. Meanwhile, responses that are evidence-based, proportionate and rights-respecting are more likely to maintain public confidence and achieve sustainable outcomes.
4. Effective approaches should focus not only on responding to risks once they have emerged, but also on addressing the conditions that can make individuals susceptible to radicalisation in the first place.
5. This is particularly important in relation to children and young people, who are increasingly represented in Australia's violent extremism caseload and whose pathways to radicalisation frequently occur online.
6. Contemporary pathways are often shaped less by adherence to a single political or religious ideology. Instead, they are often a combination of grievances, social isolation, harmful online communities and exposure to content that normalises hostility, dehumanisation or violence.
7. Increasingly, individuals may be drawn into violence-supportive beliefs through overlapping narratives involving misogyny, conspiracy theories, anti-LGBTIQA+ hostility, social exclusion and perceived grievances.
8. We make the following recommendations:

Recommendations

Recommendation 1: The Australian Government should ensure that all countering violent extremism policies, programs and interventions affecting children and young people are implemented consistently with Australia's obligations under the *Convention on the Rights of the Child,* including the requirement that the best interests of the child be a primary consideration.

Recommendation 2: The Australian Government should adopt a pathway-based approach to preventing and countering violent extremism that focuses on behaviours, vulnerabilities, influences and risk factors, rather than relying primarily on ideological categorisations.

Recommendation 3: The Australian Government should commission ongoing independent research into the impact of recommender systems, artificial intelligence and emerging technologies on pathways to radicalisation, particularly among children and young people.

Recommendation 4: The Australian Government should introduce a digital duty of care framework.

Recommendation 5: The Australian Government should continue to fund evidence-based prevention, intervention and disengagement programs and require funded providers to tailor interventions to participants' individual circumstances, needs and risk factors.

Recommendation 6: The Australian Government should require all Commonwealth-funded countering violent extremism and disengagement programs to undergo regular independent evaluation and publish evaluation findings to the greatest extent possible.

Recommendation 7: The Australian Government should fund and evaluate evidence-based online intervention programs that engage users displaying indicators of vulnerability to radicalisation before they enter violent extremist online environments.

Recommendation 8: The Australian Government should fund the Commission to conduct regular, child-centred consultations to understand the risks and drivers of radicalisation online.

Recommendation 9: The Australian Government should provide additional funding for digital literacy among children and young people in vulnerable cohorts.

1 Radicalisation of young people

This section examines young people's vulnerability to radicalisation, particularly online. We call for responses consistent with the Convention on the Rights of the Child and caution against premature criminalisation that limits diversion and rehabilitation.

16. We are greatly concerned by evidence that children and young people are increasingly represented among individuals vulnerable to radicalisation to violent extremism.[1] We consider that responses to radicalisation involving children and young people should be informed by Australia's obligations under the *Convention on the Rights of the Child*. Consistent with the principle that the best interests of the child must be a primary consideration, children and young people should be recognised as having distinct developmental needs, vulnerabilities and capacities.

Recommendation 1: The Australian Government should ensure that all countering violent extremism policies, programs and interventions affecting children and young people are implemented consistently with Australia's obligations under the *Convention on the Rights of the Child,* including the requirement that the best interests of the child be a primary consideration.

Radicalisation online

17. Digital platforms now form a central part of children and young people's social lives.[2] Prior to the introduction of Australia's social media ban, the vast majority (96%) of children aged 10–15 used social media.[3] Young people have grown up with online spaces as a familiar part of everyday life. The joint Five Eyes report describes minors as 'digital natives' and recognises that the internet constitutes a large portion of many young people's lives.[4]

18. For many young people, online spaces are an important source of connection and meaningful participation in social and civic life. However, for some young people, the digital environment is also a key pathway for radicalisation. For example, Mike Burgess (Director-General of Security at ASIO) has previously warned on several occasions that:

> *… the internet is the most potent incubator of extremism. AI is likely to make radicalisation easier and faster.*[5]
>
> *ASIO [is] seeing an increase in the radicalisation of young Australians. Unfortunately and alarmingly, this trend is continuing. The number of minors being radicalised is getting higher and the age of the minors being radicalised is getting lower. Most of the radicalisation occurs online, reflecting the dynamic I raised earlier, but some of it also now embracing extremism …*[6]

19. Evidence given by Vidhya Ramalingam Rajah of Moonshot (a global counter-extremism organisation) before the Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion also described a sharp rise in minors engaging with extremist ideologies and violence, including children as young as 12.[7] She also cited data from a New Zealand prevention program suggesting that up to 49% of people searching online for violence-inciting material may be under 18.[8]

20. Misogyny and gender-based grievances are increasingly recognised as factors that may contribute to radicalisation among some young people[9]. Efforts to prevent and respond to radicalisation should therefore consider the influence of online misogynistic content and gender-based violence narratives alongside other drivers of extremism.

21. The *Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Prohibited Hate Symbols and Other Measures) Act 2023* (Cth) introduced terrorism offences relating to accessing and possessing violent extremist material. While individuals of any age may encounter extremist material without fully appreciating its significance, children and young people, as well as some people with cognitive disability, may face particular challenges in critically assessing online content and recognising manipulation, misinformation or harmful narratives. Critics argue that these offences may bring children into the criminal justice system at an earlier stage than previous terrorism laws, including where there is no evidence that a child intended to engage in violence or had begun planning a terrorist act.[10]

22. While recognising the importance of keeping people safe from terrorist threats, these offences raise concerns that criminalisation may occur before any concrete risk of harm has emerged, potentially limiting opportunities for diversion and rehabilitation. Where children and young people are involved, priority should be given to approaches that promote their best interests, support their development and maximise opportunities for rehabilitation and reintegration, rather than relying primarily on punitive responses.

2 Changing nature of radicalisation

This section examines how radicalisation increasingly develops through shifting grievances and harmful online environments rather than fixed ideologies. We call for prevention focused on pathways, behaviours and vulnerabilities, preserving opportunities for early intervention and support.

23. In examining the changing nature of radicalisation, it is useful to consider the *Overton Window,* a concept that describes the range of ideas considered socially and politically acceptable within public discourse. Changes in the boundaries of that window may contribute to normalisation of extremist narratives that were previously regarded as beyond the bounds of legitimate debate.[11] Evidence before the Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion underscored this dynamic, noting that unchecked violent rhetoric and conduct can become normalised both online and offline – reinforcing perceptions that violence is acceptable and increasing the likelihood of further violence.[12]

24. Many young people are not beginning their pathway to radicalisation by suddenly taking an interest in extremist ideas – they are slowly drip-fed fringe ideas which are promoted by online platforms.[13] For example, research indicates that algorithms particularly target accounts of young men for content that becomes gradually more extreme.[14] Extremist actors may use mainstream platforms to circulate more palatable or coded content before directing users into less moderated and higher-harm spaces.[15]

25. Evidence provided at the Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion demonstrated that this process is particularly harmful for children. They can be funnelled into closed spaces in which safeguards are limited, and the service provider may have little visibility of the communications occurring there.[16]

Fluid ideologies

26. As noted by ASIO, those being radicalised no longer neatly align with established political, religious or ideological categories, reflecting the increasingly fluid ideological terrain of contemporary online spaces.[17] Young people may instead be drawn into harmful online environments through grievances, social isolation, misogyny, nihilism, graphic violence or a search for belonging, rather than an initial commitment to a coherent extremist ideology.[18] Emerging research has found that misogyny and attitudes supportive of violence against women can be significant predictors of extremist attitudes among young people, highlighting that pathways to radicalisation increasingly develop through gender-based grievances and online cultures rather than traditional ideological commitments

alone[19]. These pathways are often fluid and overlapping, reflecting the increasingly fragmented nature of online spaces.[20]

27. A human rights-based approach to radicalisation should focus on the social and environmental conditions that can increase vulnerability to radicalisation. Discrimination, exclusion, social isolation, harmful online environments and exposure to dehumanising narratives may impair the enjoyment of rights recognised in international human rights law, including the rights to equality and non-discrimination,[21] participation in cultural and community life,[22] education,[23] and human dignity.[24] Addressing these underlying issues enables earlier intervention while avoiding responses that rely solely on ideological profiling or law-enforcement measures.

28. Effective prevention must therefore focus on the pathways and conditions that enable escalation toward violent extremism – including vulnerability, behaviour, platform design and repeated exposure to harmful content. This is particularly important for children and young people, whose engagement with extremist content may not reflect a settled ideological commitment but rather developmental vulnerabilities, online influences, social pressures or a search for identity and belonging. Responses should preserve opportunities for early intervention, diversion and support before individuals become committed to violence.

Recommendation 2: The Australian Government should adopt a pathway-based approach to preventing and countering violent extremism that focuses on behaviours, vulnerabilities, influences and risk factors, rather than relying primarily on ideological categorisations.

3 Role of social media

This section examines how social media, recommender systems, AI and gaming-adjacent spaces can contribute to radicalisation. We support safeguarding, early intervention and a digital duty of care to address risks arising from platform design and operation.

29. As children's social and developmental lives become increasingly integrated with digital environments, social media platforms play a growing role in shaping exposure to harmful content, grievance-based narratives and extremist worldviews.

30. As noted throughout this submission, online radicalisation pathways are not confined to any single ideology and may involve religiously motivated violent extremism, racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism, conspiracy-driven movements, gender-based grievance movements or hybrid forms of extremism.

Gendered grievances

31. Gendered grievances are increasingly recognised as a factor that can contribute to pathways into radicalisation. Research by the University of Melbourne found that hostility towards women was a stronger predictor of extremist attitudes than political ideology, religion or ethnicity – identifying misogyny as a factor that may cut across multiple forms of violent extremism.[25]

32. One prominent contemporary pathway to radicalisation is via the *manosphere*, a collection of online communities that promote and celebrate rigid gender stereotypes, hostility towards women, anti-LGBTIQA+ sentiment and narratives of male victimhood. While these communities vary considerably, they are linked by a shared belief that feminism and gender equality have disadvantaged men and that traditional binary gender hierarchies should be restored.[26]

33. Social media did not create hostility towards women, nor the social acceptance of male bonding through expressions of disrespect towards women. Rather, these attitudes and behaviours pre-date digital platforms. However, social media has amplified their reach, visibility and normalisation – enabling misogynistic content and communities to spread more rapidly and influence broader audiences.

34. For children and young people navigating questions of identity, belonging and self-worth, online communities (particularly those that frame personal frustrations as the result of social change or progress towards gender equality) provide simple explanations for complex experiences. In doing so, they may encourage grievance-based interpretations that attribute personal challenges to perceived social or cultural threats, fostering a sense of injustice and

externalising responsibility for those experiences.[27] Where those narratives are reinforced over time, they may contribute to the acceptance of increasingly exclusionary, dehumanising or violence-supportive attitudes.[28]

35. Violence-supportive attitudes towards women and hostility towards LGBTIQA+ people are often underpinned by similar beliefs about gender, identity and social hierarchy. Consequently, anti-woman and anti-LGBTIQA+ narratives frequently appear across a range of extremist movements, including some extreme right-wing, conspiratorial, incel and religiously motivated extremist movements, broadening the range of groups that may be targeted by hatred, exclusion or violence.[29]

36. The recent Victorian Parliamentary Inquiry into Anti-LGBTIQA+ Hate Crimes heard evidence that social media algorithms can amplify anti-LGBTIQA+ content and contribute to the dissemination of harmful narratives online. The Committee concluded that technology platforms, including social media and dating apps, have aided the coordination and amplification of anti-LGBTIQA+ violence.[30]

Algorithmic engagement

37. Platforms apply machine-learning models to vast stores of behavioural data to predict what content will capture attention.[31] In practice, this can result in repeated exposure to high-arousal, polarising or sensational content. For some young people, this may contribute to the creation of online environments in which harmful narratives become normalised and alternative viewpoints become less visible.

38. As eSafety has noted, these systems identify user attributes and behavioural patterns and then optimise content delivery based on platform-defined objectives, such as time-on-device or ad exposure.[32] Because emotionally charged material reliably generates strong reactions, recommender systems often elevate sensational or polarising content over nuanced or contextualised information.[33] This means harmful narratives can gain visibility not because they reflect users' preferences, but because they generate engagement.

39. This kind of content curation can lead people to spend time in online 'echo chambers', digital spaces where people mostly encounter opinions they already agree with, and where disagreement or critical discussion is rare.[34] Certain platform design features and engagement optimisation systems may prioritise content that attracts attention and engagement, potentially contributing to the formation and reinforcement of online echo chambers.[35] Within these echo chambers the contest of ideas and challenging of opinions is rare.[36] As noted by the Australian Federal Police (AFP), these echo chambers lack alternative content and reinforce extremist narratives.[37]

40. Experiments confirm how quickly recommender systems can escalate alarming content once a young person interacts with even mainstream male-oriented content. In 2024, Reset.Tech Australia demonstrated that a fictional 17-year-old boy who simply liked and searched for Jordan Peterson posts on Instagram began receiving Andrew Tate content within two hours.[38] As the account continued to follow platform-generated recommendations, the algorithm progressively served more overtly misogynistic and anti-feminist material.[39] This illustrates how easy it is to be pushed into increasingly extreme content.

Artificial intelligence

41. AI is likely to further change how radicalisation occurs online. ASIO has observed that AI may make radicalisation both easier and faster.[40] This is largely due to its generative capacity to produce volumes of content at low cost. In turn, this increases the scale and reach of extremist propaganda, conspiracy theories and grievance-based narratives.

42. Given the rapid evolution of digital platforms, recommender systems and AI technologies, ongoing research is necessary to understand how these technologies influence pathways to radicalisation and whether existing interventions remain effective. While there is growing evidence that platform design can shape exposure to harmful content and communities[41], significant questions remain regarding the operation of emerging technologies, their impacts on children and young people, and the measures most likely to reduce risk.

Recommendation 3: The Australian Government should commission ongoing independent research into the impact of recommender systems, artificial intelligence and emerging technologies on pathways to radicalisation, particularly among children and young people.

Gaming and gaming-adjacent communities

43. Online gaming environments are increasingly important social spaces for children and young people.[42] Some gaming ecosystems often include voice-chat services, livestreaming platforms, private servers and messaging applications – where social relationships and online identities are formed.

44. Some of these gaming-adjacent spaces may facilitate grooming, peer-to-peer recruitment and exposure to harmful content.[43] Contemporary pathways to radicalisation may emerge through online friendships, social belonging and shared interests, rather than through formal or overt recruitment efforts. As young people move between gaming platforms and less moderated online communities, opportunities for exposure to grievance-based or violence-supportive narratives may increase.[44]

45. Responses should focus on safeguarding, digital literacy and early intervention – rather than characterising gaming communities themselves as a source of extremism. Measures should recognise gaming may play a role in children's participation, expression and social connection while addressing foreseeable risks.

Digital duty of care

46. The Commission has consistently supported a carefully designed Digital Duty of Care (DDC) as a more effective and rights-respecting response to systemic online harms.[45] A DDC would shift Australia's framework beyond reliance on complaints and the removal of individual items of content after harm has occurred. Instead, regulated services would be required to identify reasonably foreseeable risks arising from the design and operation of their services, assess those risks regularly, and take proportionate steps to prevent or mitigate them.[46]

47. A DDC could play an important role in reducing pathways to radicalisation among children and young people. As noted earlier, young users may be drawn towards harmful communities through a gradual process, normalising hostility towards perceived out-groups and making progressively more extreme content appear familiar or socially acceptable. A DDC focused on foreseeable systemic risks would require providers to examine how platform design features, recommender systems and other product choices may contribute to those pathways, and to implement safeguards to reduce those risks. This approach is better suited to addressing the early stages of radicalisation than a framework focused solely on removing content that has already crossed a legal threshold.

Recommendation 4: The Australian Government should introduce a digital duty of care framework.

4 Prevention and early intervention

This section examines how radicalisation increasingly develops through shifting grievances and harmful online environments rather than fixed ideologies. We call for prevention focused on pathways, behaviours and vulnerabilities, preserving opportunities for early intervention and support.

48. Prevention and early intervention are more effective and less rights-restrictive than late-stage law enforcement responses, particularly for children and young people.

49. Responses to violent extremism are most effective when they address the factors that contribute to vulnerability before an individual becomes committed to extremist beliefs or violence. Children and young people are increasingly represented in Australia's violent extremism caseload, making prevention and early intervention an essential part of Australia's response.

50. Law enforcement and national security measures play an important role in responding to individuals who pose a risk of violence. However, these measures often occur at a relatively late stage in the radicalisation process and may not adequately account for how children and young people think, develop and make decisions.[47]

51. Effective responses therefore require tailored interventions that address broader protective factors, including family relationships, education, community connection and wellbeing. Prevention frameworks should be adapted to the circumstances of a generation whose social relationships, identity formation and exposure to harmful content may occur substantially online. Prevention and early intervention initiatives should be designed and implemented in a manner that is necessary, proportionate and evidence-based, recognising that the promotion and protection of human rights can contribute to long-term efforts to reduce the risk of radicalisation.

52. A human rights-based approach to preventing and countering violent extremism is consistent with international human rights guidance and the work of other national human rights institutions. For example, the New Zealand Human Rights Commission has emphasised that prevention efforts should be grounded in human rights, participation, non-discrimination and social cohesion[48], while the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights while Countering Terrorism has cautioned that rights-affirming approaches are more likely to achieve sustainable outcomes than measures that undermine human rights.[49]

53. In the Australian context, fostering inclusion, equality and meaningful participation in community life should form part of a comprehensive prevention framework. Measures that address discrimination, exclusion and barriers to

participation can help strengthen social cohesion and reduce risk factors associated with vulnerability to violent extremism.

54. Effective prevention and response measures should be informed by ongoing engagement with those most affected by extremism, hate and radicalisation, including on the basis of race, religion, sex, gender and other protected attributes. Such consultation can improve understanding of emerging risks and support the development of evidence-based responses.

55. While the evidence base remains limited, Australian research consistently suggests that effective interventions are individualised, address factors beyond ideology such as social connection and wellbeing, and recognise disengagement from violent extremism as a long-term (and not necessarily linear) process of reintegration rather than an immediate change in beliefs. Preliminary research suggests that appropriately designed initiatives may provide opportunities to engage individuals before they become embedded in violent extremist communities. Such approaches may be particularly valuable where they are voluntary, proportionate, rights-respecting and integrated with broader psychosocial support, community-based prevention initiatives and offline intervention pathways.

56. We emphasise the importance of ongoing investment in evidence-based programs, while also highlighting the continued need for robust independent evaluation and public reporting to better understand what works, for whom, and why.

Recommendation 5: The Australian Government should continue to fund evidence-based prevention, intervention and disengagement programs and require funded providers to tailor interventions to participants' individual circumstances, needs and risk factors.

57. Recommendation 6: The Australian Government should require all Commonwealth-funded countering violent extremism and disengagement programs to undergo periodic review (having regard to the nature, duration and scale of the program) by suitably qualified evaluators independent of the program, and publish evaluation findings to the greatest extent possible.

Recommendation 7: The Australian Government should fund and evaluate evidence-based online intervention programs that provide early, voluntary and appropriately tailored support to individuals who may be vulnerable to radicalisation.

Consultation with children

58. Regular consultation with children should inform efforts to understand the risks and drivers of radicalisation and design effective prevention responses. The

National Children's Commissioner, as part of the Australian Human Rights Commission, should lead this consultation. A child-centred consultation process, separate from intelligence gathering, policing and online safety regulatory remit, could help children who may be reluctant to engage with those agencies to share their experiences and perspectives.

Recommendation 8: The Australian Government should fund the Commission to conduct regular, child-centred consultations to understand the risks and drivers of radicalisation online.

Digital literacy

59. Digital literacy should also form part of a comprehensive prevention approach, particularly for children and young people in vulnerable cohorts. The Australian Government should invest in evidence-based initiatives that strengthen the ability of children and young people to critically assess online content, recognise manipulation and harmful narratives, and seek support where needed. This work should complement, rather than replace, measures addressing risks arising from platform design and operation.

Recommendation 9: The Australian Government provide additional funding for digital literacy among children and young people in vulnerable cohorts.

5 Endnotes

[1] Australia Security Information Organisation ('ASIO'), 'Director-General's Annual Threat Assessment' (Speech, 9 February 2022); Five Eyes law enforcement and security agencies, *Young People and Violent Extremism: A Call for Collective Action* (Report, December 2024) 2–3.

[2] See e.g. eSafety Commissioner, *Digital Use and Risk: Online Platform Engagement among Children Aged 10 to 15* (Report, July 2025) 7; see generally Five Eyes law enforcement and security agencies, *Young People and Violent Extremism: A Call for Collective Action* (Report, December 2024) 2–3.

[3] eSafety Commissioner, *Digital Use and Risk: Online Platform Engagement among Children Aged 10 to 15* (Report, July 2025) 7.

[4] Five Eyes law enforcement and security agencies, *Young People and Violent Extremism: A Call for Collective Action* (Report, December 2024) 2–3.

[5] Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, *Right Wing Extremist Movements in Australia* (Report, December 2024) 86 [5.11], quoting ASIO, 'Director-General's National Press Club Address' (Speech, 24 April 2024).

[6] ASIO, 'Director-General's Annual Threat Assessment' (Speech, 9 February 2022).

[7] Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion, *Transcript of Proceedings*, Hearing Block 3, Day 2 (30 June 2026) 174.

[8] Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion, *Transcript of Proceedings*, Hearing Block 3, Day 2 (30 June 2026) 174.

[9] Sara Meger, *Misogyny, Online Radicalisation, and Youth Extremism in Australia* (Research Report, The University of Melbourne, June 2026) 23-25.

[10] See e.g. Ollie Gleeson-Payne & Brandy Cochrane, 'Australian Terrorism Legislation and Children's Rights Contraventions: Downloading Violent Extremist Materials' (2025) 50(2) *Alternative Law Journal* 128.

[11] Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, *Right Wing Extremist Movements in Australia* (Report, December 2024) 21 [2.21], quoting Alejandro Beutel, 'The New Zealand Terrorist's Manifesto: A Look at Some of the Key Narratives, Beliefs and Tropes', *National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism* (online, 30 April 2019). <https://www.start.umd.edu/news/new-zealand-terrorists-manifesto-look-some-key-narratives-beliefs-and-tropes>.

[12] Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion, *Transcript of Proceedings*, Hearing Block 3, Day 1 (29 June 2026) 4.

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[13] Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, *Right Wing Extremist Movements in Australia* (Report, December 2024) 86 [5.13], quoting Pam Nilan, et al., 'Young Masculinities and Right-Wing Populism in Australia' (2023) 3(1) *Youth* 285, 287.

[14] See generally Elise Thomas & Kata Balint, *Algorithms as a Weapon Against Women: How YouTube Lures Boys and Young Men into the 'Manosphere'* (Discussion Paper, Institute for Strategic Dialogue and Reset Australia, April 2022); Steven Roberts and Stephanie Wescott, 'We Research Online "Misogynist Radicalisation". Here's What Parents of Boys Should Know', *Monash Lens* (online, 1 July 2024).

[15] Timothy Cubitt and Anthony Morgan, 'Exposure to and Sharing of Fringe or Radical Content Online' (2024) 705 *Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice* 1, 2-3.

[16] Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion, *Transcript of Proceedings*, Hearing Block 3, Day 3 (1 July 2026) 258–259.

[17] Mike Burgess, 'Director-General of Security Annual Threat Assessment 2026' (Speech, 24 June 2026).

[18] Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion, *Transcript of Proceedings*, Hearing Block 3, Day 2 (30 June 2026) 174.

[19] Sara Meger, *Misogyny, Online Radicalisation, and Youth Extremism in Australia* (Research Report, The University of Melbourne, June 2026) 23-25.

[20] Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion, *Transcript of Proceedings*, Hearing Block 3, Day 2 (30 June 2026) 174.

[21] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) arts 2(1), 26.

[22] International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976) art 15(1)(a).

[23] International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976) art 13.

[24] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) Preamble; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976) Preamble.

[25] Sara Meger, *Misogyny, Online Radicalisation, and Youth Extremism in Australia* (Research Report, The University of Melbourne, June 2026) 23.

[26] Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, *Right Wing Extremist Movements in Australia* (Report, December 2024) 74 [4.103], quoting Centre for Culture and Technology, Gender Research Network and Perth Extremism Research Network, Curtin University, Submission No. 29, 3.

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[27] Stephen Thompson, Michele Grossman and Paul Thomas, 'Needs, Rights and Systems: Increasing Canadian Intimate Bystander Reporting on Radicalizing to Violence' (2024) 36(5) Terrorism and Political Violence 992.

[28] Michael Flood, 'Anti-Gender Resistance and the Resurgence of Sexism' in *Engaging Men and Boys in Violence Prevention* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019) 39.

[29] JM Roose, et al., *New Directions in Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: A Literature Review* (Report prepared for the Australian Government Department of Home Affairs, Deakin University, 2024) 40 [181].

[30] See generally Legislative Council Legal and Social Issues Committee, Parliament of Victoria, *Inquiry into Anti-LGBTIQA+ Hate Crimes in Victoria* (Report, September 2026).

[31] eSafety Commissioner, *Recommender Systems and Algorithms* (Position Statement, December 2022) 1.

[32] eSafety Commissioner, *Recommender Systems and Algorithms* (Position Statement, December 2022) 1.

[33] Joint Select Committee on Social Media and Australian Society, *Social Media: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly – Final Report* (Report, November 2024) 147; eSafety Commissioner, *Recommender Systems and Algorithms* (Position Statement, December 2022) 2.

[34] United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, *Elections in Digital Times: A Guide for Electoral Practitioners* (Report, 2022) 42.

[35] Joint Select Committee on Social Media and Australian Society, *Social Media: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly – Final Report* (Report, November 2024) 19 [3.3].

[36] Senate Select Committee on Adopting Artificial Intelligence (AI), Parliament of Australia, *Adopting Artificial Intelligence (AI)* (Final Report, November 2024) 10 [2.17].

[37] Australian Federal Police, Submission No. 27 to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, *Inquiry into Right Wing Extremist Movements in Australia* (2024) 8.

[38] Joint Select Committee on Social Media and Australian Society, *Social Media: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly – Final Report* (Report, November 2024) 148 [1.118], citing Reset.Tech Australia and Institute for Strategic Dialogue, *Algorithms as a Weapon against Women: How YouTube Lures Boys and Young Men into the 'Manosphere'* (Discussion Paper, April 2022).

[39] Joint Select Committee on Social Media and Australian Society, *Social Media: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly – Final Report* (Report, November 2024) 148 [1.118], citing Reset.Tech Australia and Institute for Strategic Dialogue, *Algorithms as a Weapon against Women: How YouTube Lures Boys and Young Men into the 'Manosphere'* (Discussion Paper, April 2022).

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[40] Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, *Right Wing Extremist Movements in Australia* (Report, December 2024) 86 [5.11], quoting Mike Burgess, 'Director-General's National Press Club Address' (Speech, 24 April 2024).

[41] eSafety Commissioner, *Recommender Systems: Position Paper* (Position Paper, May 2026) 3-6.

[42] eSafety Commissioner, *Gaming, Socialising and Safety: A Snapshot of Australian Experiences in Online Multiplayer Games* (2024) 5-8.

[43] Stephen Thompson, Michele Grossman & Paul Thomas, 'Needs, Rights and Systems: Increasing Canadian Intimate Bystander Reporting on Radicalizing to Violence' (2024) 36(5) *Terrorism and Political Violence* 638, 639-642, 645-648.

[44] Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion, Hearing Block 3, Day 3 (1 July 2026) 258-259.

[45] See e.g. Australian Human Rights Commission, *Online Safety Amendment (Digital Duty of Care) Bill 2026: Exposure Draft* (Submission, 23 September 2026); Australian Human Rights Commission, *A Digital Duty of Care for Australia* (Submission, 22 July 2026).

[46] See generally *Online Safety Amendment (Digital Duty of Care) Bill 2026* (Cth).

[47] Randy Borum, 'Developmental Considerations for Assessing the Risk of Extremist Violence in Adolescents' (2025) *Journal of Threat Assessment and Management* (advance online publication) 1, 3.

[48] New Zealand Human Rights Commission, A Human Rights Approach to Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Aotearoa (Submission, 2022).

[49] Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Human Rights Impact of Policies and Practices Aimed at Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, UN Doc A/HRC/43/46 (21 February 2020).