Commission submission - Markham

IN THE AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION VICTORIAN REGISTRY

C2002/3380

BETWEEN:

Graincorp Operations Ltd Appellant

AND: Stephen Markham Respondent

Submissions of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission

A. SUBMISSIONS ON LEAVE TO INTERVENE

1. The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission ("HREOC") seeks the leave of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission ("the Commission") under s.43 of the Workplace Relations Act ("the WR Act") to intervene at the hearing of this appeal pursuant to s.48(1)(gb) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1986 (Cth) ("the SD Act") and 11(1)(o) of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) ("the HREOC Act").

2. The form of the intervention sought, subject to the discretion of the Commission, is the filing of written submissions and the making of oral submissions during argument on the correct interpretation of s.28A of the SD ACT and issues of sexual harassment, sex-based harassment and sex discrimination as relevant to this Appeal.

Functions of HREOC under the HREOC Act and the SD ACT

3. HREOC has, inter alia, the following functions under the HREOC Act and the SD ACT [1]:

(a) where HREOC considers it appropriate to do so with the leave of the court hearing the proceedings and subject to any conditions imposed by the court, to intervene in proceedings that involve discrimination issues (s.31(j) of the HREOC Act); (b) to promote an understanding and acceptance, and the public discussion, of equality of opportunity and treatment in employment and occupation in Australia (s.31(c) of the HREOC Act); (c) where HREOC considers it appropriate to do so, with the leave of the court hearing the proceedings and subject to any conditions imposed by the court, to intervene in proceedings that involve issues of discrimination on the ground of sex, marital status, pregnancy or potential pregnancy or discrimination involving sexual harassment (s.48(1)(gb) of the SD ACT); and (d) to promote an understanding and acceptance of, and compliance with, the SD ACT (s.48(1)(d) of the SD ACT).

Experience and expertise of HREOC and the Sex Discrimination Commissioner

4. HREOC performs a wide range of activities in relation to sex discrimination in Australian workplaces and has been active in public discussion of issues relating to discrimination on the ground of sex, sexual harassment and equal opportunity in employment. HREOC has undertaken a wide range of activities aimed at eliminating all forms of discrimination against women and encouraging Australia's compliance with its international human rights obligations. Those activities have included:

(a) preparing and distributing the publication Sexual Harassment - A Code of Practice, August ߌ (b) inquiring into and conciliating complaints alleging sexual harassment and sex discrimination in employment under the SD Act and HREOC Act; (c) representation on the AIRC central working party in 1995 for the pilot award review process and subsequent intervention in proceedings to adopt the award review principles, a key aspect being the removal of discriminatory provisions from federal awards and the inclusion of a model anti-discrimination clause; (d) intervening in Gunn & Taylor Pty Ltd v AMWU, 4 June 2002 [Print PR918573] before the Australian Industrial Relations Commission regarding an application for an order for equal remuneration for work of equal value; (e) intervening in the Parental Leave Casual Employees Test Case, 31 May 2001 [Print PR904631] (2001) EOC 93-144 before the Australian Industrial Relations Commission regarding the rights of pregnant casual employees to parental leave; (f) on reference from the Attorney-General, undertaking a National Inquiry into Pregnancy and Work involving extensive consultation and research which resulted in the publication of the HREOC Report entitled Pregnant and Productive: It's a right not a privilege to work while pregnant, ߏ [2] (g) preparing submissions, dated 13 November 2000 and 16 February 2001, to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee on the Sex Discrimination Amendment Bill (No 1) 2000 and appearing before that Senate Committee to give evidence; (h) providing comments, by letter dated 21 December 1998, to the Office of the Status of Women regarding the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW"); (i) reviewing Australia's progress under CEDAW and providing comments, by letters dated 11 May 2001 and 5 July 2002, to the Office of the Status of Women on the draft of Australia's Fourth and Fifth Combined Report on CEDAW; (j) preparing a report, dated 28 June 2000, to the United Nations Human Rights Committee dealing with, amongst other things, protection against sex discrimination, the position of women in Australian society and projects undertaken by HREOC in relation to the human rights of women; (k) preparing and distributing an information package entitled Woman of the World - know your international human rights, launched on 8 March 2001 (International Women's Day); (l) participating in the United Nations General Assembly Special Session entitled Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the 21st Century (Beijing+5) on 5-9 June 2000. The United Nations General Assembly held the Special Session to review the outcomes of the 4th World Conference on Women, known as the 1995 "Beijing Conference", as set out in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action; and (m) attending the Regional Workshop on the role of national human rights institutions in advancing the human rights of women in Suva Fiji, organised by the Asia-Pacific Forum from 5-7 May 2000.

Factors relevant to grant of leave to intervene

5. HREOC submits that this appeal involves issues of general principle and public importance which may significantly affect persons other than the parties who are before it. [3]

6. HREOC further submits that it has:

(a) a legitimate concern in making submissions in relation to the proper interpretation of the provisions of the SD ACT that is in issue in these proceedings; [4] (b) an interest in the subject of litigation greater than a mere desire to have the law declared in particular terms; [5] (c) an ability to make submissions which the Commission might consider that it "should have to assist it to reach a correct determination"; [6] (d) special knowledge and expertise relevant to the issues the subject of the appeals; and (e) an ability to make submissions which differ in emphasis and content from those of the parties and which are likely to assist the Commission in a way in which the Commission "would not otherwise have been assisted". [7]

7. No practical considerations militate against the granting of leave because:

(a) the parties received adequate notice of HREOC's intention to seek leave to intervene; (b) the parties were provided with a copy of draft submissions prior to the hearing; and (c) HREOC requests only a short opportunity to make oral submissions, at the discretion of the Commission.

B. SUBSTANTIVE SUBMISSIONS

Definition of sexual harassment under the HREOC Act

8. Sexual harassment is defined by the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) as follows:

28A (1) For the purposes of this Division, a person sexually harasses another person (the person harassed) if:

(a) the person makes an unwelcome sexual advance, or an unwelcome request for sexual favours, to the person harassed; or (b) engages in other unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature in relation to the person harassed; in circumstances in which a reasonable person, having regard to all the circumstances, would have anticipated that the person harassed would be offended, humiliated or intimidated. (2) In this section:

conduct of a sexual nature includes making a statement of a sexual nature to a person, or in the presence of a person, whether the statement is made orally or in writing.

Findings of Commissioner Blair

9. The Commissioner found the facts as relevant to the issue of sexual harassment to be as follows (at [10]-[18]):

Mr Markham was aggrieved with Ms Barton and had consumed a fair amount of alcohol over a dinner at which Ms Barton was not present. Ms Barton was known to Mr Markham to be away from the hotel at which they were staying during dinner and he believed that she had not returned after dinner as her car was not parked outside.

On passing Ms Barton's room on the way back to his, he banged on the external door to her room. He did not know she was in the room. Upon returning to his room Mr Markham banged on the internal door between the rooms. There was no door handle on the doors connecting the rooms and he did not attempt to enter Ms Barton's room.

A Mr Williams was also in Mr Markham's room and sought to intervene by saying words to the effect of "you can't do that". Mr Markham then said words to the effect of "fucking bitch", "fuck the bitch" and "fucking slut". The words were directed to Williams and were a form of defiance on Mr Markham's part in response to Mr Williams' reproach.

Ms Barton was in the adjacent room and was extremely distressed by Mr Markham's actions.

10. HREOC notes the Appellant has appealed against the factual findings of the Commissioner. HREOC does not seek to make submissions in relation to matters of fact, but rather set out what it contends are the appropriate principles applicable to whatever facts are found by the Commission on appeal to be made out. HREOC submits that the Commissioner erred in the principles applied to the facts as found.

11. The Commissioner made the following findings of law in relation to sexual harassment (see [23] - [28]) about which HREOC seeks to make submissions:

(a) Words to the effect of "fuck the bitch", "fucking bitch" and "fucking slut" are not words of a sexual nature. These expressions are to be looked at "in the same terms as the use of the words 'fucking bastard' which is generally directed towards a male". Similarly the words "well fuck him" is a figure of speech that does not necessarily indicate a sexual intention. (b) Conduct can only be unwelcome if the conduct is "directly directed towards the person who may find it unwelcome". (c) "The person 'harassed is, or would be offended humiliated or intimidated' by the conduct infers that there is intent to harass the person who would be 'offended, humiliated or intimidated' by the conduct." (d) For a reasonable person to have "anticipated that the person harassed would have felt this way" assumes that the person who is making the comments "knows that the person whom the comments are about can actually hear them".

Do the words spoken constitute words "of a sexual nature"?

12. HREOC does not submit that the words found by the Commissioner to have been spoken ("fuck the bitch", "fucking bitch" and "fucking slut") were, in the specific context in which the Commissioner found them to have been uttered, "of a sexual nature" such that they would constitute sexual harassment. [8] However, these words could, in a different context, constitute sexual harassment. Furthermore, the line between such expressions and others which would constitute language "of a sexual nature" may be a fine one and, in approaching such expressions, an acknowledgement of sex-based language and the context of power in gender relationships is important. HREOC submits that, although the Commissioner may have been correct in his ultimate conclusion regarding sexual harassment, his reasoning failed to acknowledge this context and the significance of sex-based language.

13. HREOC submits that the Commissioner erred in trying to draw parallels with expressions such as "fuck the bastard" when directed towards a male. This expression differs relevantly from the expressions found to have been used in the present case for a number of reasons.

14. The first is that "fuck the bitch" and "fucking slut" are sex-based insults. "Slut" carries a clear sexual connotation, and both "bitch" and "slut" are, on their face, gender-specific terms. The same is simply not the case with the expression "bastard" which is not gender-specific (whether or not it may be directed more frequently to males than females).

15. The second is that derogatory or abusive terms spoken by a male to a female can be qualitatively different to the same abusive terms spoken by a male to a male, a female to a female or a female to a male. [9] By way of example, a woman calling a man a "bitch" or a "slut" would not necessarily carry the same meaning or impact as a man using the same terms in reference to a woman.

16. It is also relevant to consider the power dynamics that exist in male/female relationships in the context of the work environment. Historically the workplace has been a male domain, organised consistently with male needs and interests. [10] These organisational arrangements "create countless contexts of power inequities in which men occupy the majority or the only positions of power and authority". [11] While not advocating a one-dimensional analysis of power relations in the workforce, HREOC submits that this power differential between the sexes continues to exist in many workplaces to the detriment of female workers.

17. HREOC submits that the combination of these factors means that not only is it incorrect to equate "fucking bitch" with "fucking bastard", but the error is compounded by ignoring the context of the comments - that they are spoken in a work-related environment by a man about a woman.

18. While this error may not, in HREOC's submission, have resulted in the Commissioner reaching the wrong conclusion in relation to the particular words spoken in this case, the approach should not be followed in considering other expressions or the same expressions in different contexts. The use of such expressions may, for example, contribute to a hostile or "sexually permeated" work environment. In such a context the use of the expressions may be, of themselves, acts of sexual harassment. [12] As developed below, sex-based insults may also constitute or contribute to an environment that discriminates on the basis of sex.

Do words need to be directed to, or spoken in the presence of the subject to constitute "unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature"?

19. The Commissioner found that conduct "can only be unwelcome… if the conduct is directly directed towards the person who may find it unwelcome". Although this finding is not developed, it seems that the Commissioner is proceeding on the basis that "welcoming" connotes a "willing reception" - and that for something to be "unwelcome" it must be received other than willingly (and without such reception something can neither be "welcome" nor "unwelcome").

20. However, while a person harassed needs to be aware, or made aware, of the relevant conduct, it is not necessary that they "receive" such conduct directly. "Conduct of a sexual nature" is defined in s.28A(2) as including "making a statement of a sexual nature to a person, or in the presence of a person, whether the statement is made orally or in writing". "A person" is to be distinguished from "the person harassed" - the definition does not require that the statement be made to "the person harassed" but contemplates that the statement can be made to "a person" generally. This includes a statement to a third person in the absence of the person harassed.

21. There are a variety of situations in which HREOC would submit sexual harassment is committed in the absence of the person harassed but the person harassed subsequently becomes aware of such conduct. For example, employee X should be found to have sexually harassed employee Y if X makes sexually explicit comments about Y to co-employees in Y's absence. Similarly, it should properly be found that it is sexual harassment if X distributes sexually explicit material (physically or electronically) concerning Y to co-employees (excluding Y) or if male employee X displays sexually explicit photographs of Y in the men's toilets to which Y has no access. [13]

Does a harasser need to intend that the person be harassed?

22. HREOC submits that the Commissioner also erred in finding that there needs to be an "intent to harass". The relevant test is whether or not a reasonable person, having regard to all the circumstances, would have anticipated offence, humiliation or intimidation. This test was applied in Johanson v Michael Blackledge Meats [2001] FMCA 6 (1 March 2001), by Driver FM who went on to state (at [89] emphasis added):

It is clear that there have been instances where employers have been found liable for harassment of employees in circumstances where offensive posters or other offensive material have been left around the workplace and seen by the complainant. In some instances this material was on display prior to the arrival of the complainant in the workplace. In G v R and the Department of Health, Housing and Community Services (unreported, HREOC, 23 August 1993) a toy in form of a jack-in-the-box with a penis substituted for the normal figure was put on the desk of the complainant's husband. Other employees passed comments about the toy but these were not directed at the complainant. The complaint failed for other reasons but Sir Ronald Wilson found that the conduct complained of could constitute sexual harassment of the complainant even though she was not the target. Clearly, it is not necessary that the complainant be the conscious target of the offensive conduct. Sexual harassment can occur where the conduct is directed at a limited class of people (eg employees). I see no material difference in the case of conduct directed at customers or potential customers. Once a person chooses to engage in conduct of a sexual nature in which another person, whether the intended target or not, who has not sought or invited the conduct, experiences offence, humiliation or intimidation and, in the circumstances, a reasonable person would have anticipated that reaction, the elements of sexual harassment are made out.

23. The circumstances of Johanson v Michael Blackledge Meats were that a customer had been sold a bone which had been fashioned into the shape of a penis by an employee. It was found that the sale of the particular bone was unintentional, but the transaction as a whole constituted sexual harassment. His Honour continued (at [90] emphasis added):

An additional factor here is that the person who sold the bone, Mr Finlay, did not intend to sell anything other than an ordinary bone. But Mr Finlay was not the only employee involved and the act of sale of the bone was not the only relevant act that occurred in the shop. Ben Lithgow intentionally created a phallic object on the premises with the assistance of Ted Brown. After showing the object to his friend, Ben Lithgow placed it in the cool room with all of the other bones in such a way as it could not be readily distinguished from ordinary bones. It follows that while the sale of an offensive object was not a conscious act by the respondents or their employees the creation of the object and its retention on the premises in circumstances that gave rise to a reasonable likelihood of such sale were deliberate acts of an employee. When one examines all of the circumstances it is clear that a course of conduct was engaged in which exposed Ms Johanson to the risk of obtaining from the shop an offensive object that she did not want and which caused her serious offence. I conclude, therefore, that the elements of harassment for the purposes of s.28A and s.28G have been made out.

24. In the present case, the employee Mr Markham may argue that a reasonable person would not have anticipated offence, humiliation or intimidation by reason of the fact that he did not believe that the other employee would hear the words spoken (as it was believed she was not in the room). To the contrary, however, the evidence that the employee Mr Williams tried to stop Mr Markham would suggest that a reasonable person would have thought the behaviour was inappropriate per se as it was offensive, humiliating and intimidating even in the absence of Ms Barton. Furthermore a reasonable person may have foreseen that Ms Barton may return during the outburst, overhear the outburst from the hallway, or even hear about the outburst through others at a later stage and find it offensive, humiliating and intimidating.

For a reasonable person to anticipate that a person will feel offended etc, is it necessary for the person who makes the comments to know that the subject can actually hear those comments?

25. HREOC submits that such knowledge is not necessary. As suggested above, a reasonable person may anticipate that their comments will be overheard or relayed by fellow employees or bystanders to the person harassed after the event. The finding appears, with respect, to follow the Commissioner's error in relation to intention.

Sex-Based Harassment as Discrimination

26. HREOC submits that the Commission, in reaching a decision on whether or not a termination is "harsh, unjust or unreasonable", should consider an employer's obligation to maintain a work environment that does not condone sex-based harassment.

27. It is well established that behaviour that falls within the definition of sexual harassment will also constitute sex discrimination. [14]

28. Sex-based harassment falling outside the definition of sexual harassment may also constitute less favourable treatment in the conditions of employment (s.14(2)(a) of the SD ACT) or amount to subjecting an employee to a detriment (s.14(2)(d) of the SD ACT) and may create or contribute to a work environment that discriminates against women.

29. The Commission is required to take into account the principles embodied in the SD Act relating to discrimination in relation to employment; s.93 of the WR Act.

Equal Opportunity Considerations

30. HREOC further submits that the Commission should have regard to the broader context of equality of opportunity in employment in determining what constitutes "harsh, unjust and unreasonable" termination.

31. In addition to the requirement of s.93 of the WR Act that the Commission take into account the principles embodied in the SD Act, the objects of the WR Act set out in s.3 include:

(j) respecting and valuing the diversity of the work force by helping to prevent and eliminate discrimination on the basis of … sex…; and (k) assisting in giving effect to Australia's international obligations in relation to labour standards.

32. While the WR Act gives effect to these objects through certain specific provisions, [15] the objects are applicable to the WR Act as a whole. Such an approach has been taken by the Commission in proceedings under s.170CE in Johnston v Kew Aged Care Pty Ltd t/as Parkland Close[16] and Tsipas v Brimbank City Council. [17] 33. It is also an accepted principle of the common law that a statute is to be interpreted and applied, as far as its language permits, so that it is consistent with established rules of international law. [18] As noted by Mason CJ and Deane J in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273 at 287-8:

If the language of the legislation is susceptible of a construction which is consistent with the terms of the international instrument and the obligations which it imposes on Australia, then that construction should prevail.

34. The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) [19] is the principal international human rights convention dealing with the human rights of women. It forms the Schedule to the SD Act and as such is part of the statute; Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s.13(2). It provides relevantly:

Article 3 States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the political, social, economic and cultural fields, all appropriate measures, including legislation, to ensure the full development and advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men.

Article 5 States parties shall take all appropriate measures: (a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women…

Article 11 1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of employment in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, the same rights, in particular: …. (d) The right to … equal treatment in respect of work of equal value, as well as equality of treatment in the evaluation of the quality of work; …. (f) The right to protection of health and safety in working conditions

35. Australia is also a member to the Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation (ILO 111). [20] This provides relevantly:

Article 1 1. For the purpose of this Convention the term "discrimination" includes - (a) any distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of… sex… which has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation

Article 2 Each Member for which this Convention is in force undertakes to declare and pursue a national policy designed to promote, by methods appropriate to national conditions and practice, equality of opportunity and treatment in respect of employment and occupation, with a view to eliminating any discrimination in respect thereof.

36. Sex-based harassment (whether it falls within the definition of sexual harassment or not) enforces and perpetuates modes of behaviour that should not be seen as acceptable in light of the international standards to which Australia has committed itself. Consistent with the SD Act and the objects of the WR Act these considerations should be taken into account when determining whether or not the conduct of an employer, in terminating an employee on the basis of sex-based harassment, is "harsh, unjust and unreasonable".

37. A work environment in which sex-based insults are tolerated will, in HREOC's submission, inhibit equal opportunity and equal participation in the workplace by reinforcing or perpetuating existing inequality and disparate power relationships in the workplace.

38. HREOC notes the evidence of Ms Barton that she would feel compelled to resign if Mr Markham was reinstated because she would be unable to feel safe in the workplace (at [43]). The Commissioner declined to be influenced by these comments in reaching his decision, but does not appear to have doubted that Ms Barton's fears were genuine. This highlights the damaging influence of sex-based insults, whether or not they fall within the parameters of sexual harassment as defined by the SD Act.

19 August 2002

ENDNOTES

1. Section 11(1)(a) of the HREOC Act provides that the functions of HREOC include such functions as are conferred on HREOC by the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 or any other enactment. 2. On behalf of the Commission, the then Sex Discrimination Commissioner received over 100 written submissions and also undertook a wide range of consultations and interviews. Focus groups were hosted by interested organisations around the country. The then Sex Discrimination Commissioner also undertook extensive consultations with government, employers, employees and employee organisations in relation to a range of pregnancy and work issues. 3. United States Tobacco Co v Minister for Consumer Affairs (1988) 20 FCR 520 at 534. 4. Australian Railways Union v Victorian Railways Commission (1930) 44 CLR 319 at 331 per Dixon J. 5. Kruger v Commonwealth of Australia (1996) 3 Leg Rep 14 per Brennan CJ. 6. Levy v State of Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579 at 603 per Brennan CJ. 7. Ibid at 604 per Brennan CJ. 8. It is noted that the NSW Equal Opportunity Tribunal in O'Callaghan v Loder (1984) EOC 92-023, albeit prior to the direct legislative prohibition on sexual harassment, identified "gender-based insults or taunts" in its inclusive list of "sexual conduct". 9. Similarly, racial taunts carry vastly different meanings depending upon context - "white bastard" cannot necessarily be equated with "black bastard", and the difference between the terms will depend upon the context in which they are used. 10. See Aruna Rao, Rieky Stuart and David Kelleher Gender at Work: Organizational Change for Equality, Kumarian Press, Hartford, 1999 page 5. 11. Paula J Dubeck and Kathryn Borman (eds) Women and Work: A Handbook, Garland Publishing, New York, 1996 page 323. 12. See Djokic v Sinclair & Central Queensland Meat Export Co Pty Ltd [1994] HREOCA 16 (20 July 1994), https://www.austlii.edu.au/, Zoiti v The Cheesecake Factory Pty Ltd [1993] HREOCA 12 (7 June 1993), https://www.austlii.edu.au/; Rutherford v Wilson & State of Queensland [2001] QADT 7 (21 May 2001), https://www.austlii.edu.au/ at p.51 and Horne & Anor v Press Clough Joint Venture & Anor (1994) EOC 92-556. Repeated use of language such as "slut" may also constitute sexual harassment; see Edwards v Bourke Bowling Club Limited [2000] NSWADT 31 (31 March 2000), https://www.austlii.edu.au/ at [66] and [101]. 13. Such acts would also contribute to a hostile or "sexually permeated" environment; see note 12 above. 14. See Johanson v Michael Blackledge Meats op cit at [96] and also O'Callaghan v Loder op cit, Aldridge v Booth (1988) 80 ALR 1 at 16, Hall & Others v A & A Sheiban Pty Ltd & Others (1989) 20 FCR 217 per French J at 274 and consideration by Lockhart J at 233-235. 15. These sections are not relevant for the present case; see for example s.170BA. In the case of Division 3 of Part VIA of the WR Act under which this case is brought, the stated objects of the Division in s.170CA are the "principal" objects (cf s.17BA), confirming that the more general objects of the WR Act apply. 16. 1476/98 M Print Q9544 (9 December 1998), decision of Commissioner Foggo. 17. 1460/98 M Print Q9442 (7 December 1998), decision of Commissioner Lewin. 18. Kartinyeri v Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337 at 384 per Gummow and Hayne JJ; Polites v The Commonwealth (1945) 70 CLR 60. 19. Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 2263(XXII) of 7 November 1967, entry into force for Australia 27 August 1983. 20. Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, proclaimed by the General Conference of the International Labour Organisation on 4 June 1958, entry into force for Australia 15 June 1974. The Convention is annexed to the HREOC Act in Schedule 1.

Last updated 6 September 2002.