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An International Comparison of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (2008) Chapter 2: Standing

An International Comparison of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975

Chapter 2: Standing

2.1 Australia
2.2 Canada
2.3 European Union
2.4 United Kingdom
2.5 United States
2.5.1 Standing to Lodge a Complaint – Employment and Housing Discrimination
2.5.2 Enforcement by the Attorney-General
2.5.3 Standing to Initiate a Civil Action
2.6 Key Differences Between Australian and International Regimes

While the prohibition of racial discrimination as an unlawful act is an
important step towards its eradication, the effectiveness of such laws
ultimately depends on their enforceability. The issue of effective enforcement
of anti-discrimination laws is a particularly complex one. In deciding who, when
and where parties can seek to enforce the law, legislators must take into
account factors such as the impact of discrimination on private rights and the
public interest, the special vulnerability of many victims of discrimination,
the broad, systemic nature of many discriminatory practices and the need to
minimise the cost of enforcement, as well as deciding how such costs should be
distributed within society.

The enforcement mechanisms in each of the jurisdictions being examined differ
substantially. All four national systems include at least one independent
statutory body with an anti-discrimination role; however there is substantial
variation in the way these bodies operate, the role they play in the dispute
process, and the alternative or additional means of enforcement provided by the
courts. Several jurisdictions possess what might be described as a ‘two
stage’ process, where a complaint may (or must) go before a discrimination
commission before it appears before the courts, and the rules for standing can
differ at each stage.

2.1 Australia

Enforcement of the law in Australia involves just such a two stage process.
Complaints of race discrimination must first be lodged with the Human Rights
and Equal Opportunity Commission
(HREOC). HREOC assesses the complaint and
attempts to achieve conciliation between the parties. If the conciliation is
successful, and the parties enter into an agreement, the process ends at the
first stage. If, however, HREOC terminates the complaint on any ground, then any
person affected by the complaint (as defined below) may elect to bring an action
before the court. A complaint may be terminated for any of a range of reasons;
from an assessment by HREOC that it is ill-founded or vexatious, right through
to an opinion that the subject matter is of such public importance that it
requires public litigation. It may also be terminated on the grounds that
conciliation has no reasonable prospects of
success.[1] Bringing a complaint
before HREOC is thus a prerequisite to litigation, however there is no
requirement that HREOC reach any particular conclusion about the merit of the
complaint for it to proceed to litigation in the courts.

The test for standing to bring a complaint before HREOC is quite broad,
although narrower than the Canadian test discussed below. One or more
‘persons aggrieved’ by the discrimination may lodge a complaint,
either on their own behalf or on behalf of a class of similarly aggrieved
persons.[2] A non-aggrieved person or
trade union can also bring a complaint on behalf of one or more aggrieved
persons (though not on their own
behalf).[3] Where a complaint is on
behalf of a class of persons, it is not necessary for all of them to be
complainants, or to give their express consent to the action, but an individual
can elect to withdraw from the class by giving

A ‘person aggrieved’ is not defined in the Act, but has been
interpreted by the Australian courts to mean a person who “is likely to
gain some advantage, other than the satisfaction of righting a wrong, upholding
a principle or winning a contest, if his action succeeds or to suffer some
disadvantage, other than a sense of grievance... if his action
[5] This advantage or
disadvantage must be beyond that experienced by an ordinary member of the
public.[6] Effectively this means that
people who have been discriminated against (and those who represent them) have
standing to make a complaint, while concerned bystanders and those seeking to
uphold public rights, which affect everyone equally, are excluded.

A legal person (such as a corporation) may also be a ‘person
aggrieved’ if it is subject to discrimination “by reason of the
race, colour or national or ethnic origin of any associate of that
.[7] It must,
however, be ‘aggrieved’ in its own right, and not merely have
members who are individually aggrieved. For example, if the corporation is
denied a lease because of the race of its members it has standing, while if some
of its members have been denied services because of their race only the
individuals themselves have standing to complain. Non-incorporated associations,
with the exception of trade unions, do not have standing to bring a complaint,
however the head of such an association may have personal standing to make a
complaint on behalf of the individual members whose rights have been

Once a complaint has been terminated, any person on whose behalf the
complaint was lodged (described in the act as an ‘affected person’)
has standing to take the complaint before the
courts.[9] Thus the plaintiff before
the court need not be the same person as the complainant before HREOC. Indeed,
in the case of a person or trade union who brings a complaint on behalf of an
aggrieved person, the complainant will lack standing in the courts, and only the
‘person aggrieved’ may bring an action on their own behalf.

Unusually, when compared with the other jurisdictions, the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission does not have standing to
independently initiate an action for discrimination in the courts. Only once
proceedings have been initiated by a person (or persons) affected by the
discrimination can HREOC seek leave to intervene or can a Commissioner apply to
assist the court as amicus
curiae.[10] HREOC does have the
power to decide, of its own volition, to inquire into any act or practice
that is done by or on behalf of the Commonwealth that might be inconsistent with
any human right, or any act or practice that may constitute discrimination in
employment.[11] If, as a result of
either of these lines of inquiry, HREOC decides that human rights have been
violated, it may attempt to achieve conciliation between the parties involved
or, where this is not appropriate or does not achieve the desired outcome, may
make a report to the relevant government
minister.[12] Even where the inquiry
reveals acts of unlawful discrimination, however, HREOC cannot initiate legal
action against the party concerned.

2.2 Canada

The Canadian system also involves a two stage process of complaint
investigation by the Canadian Human Rights Commission, followed by a
quasi-judicial hearing before the independent Human Rights Tribunal. In
contrast to the Australian mechanism, however, individuals do not have
independent access to the second stage of the process, and the Commission alone
has the power to bring complaints before the Tribunal. The Commission is thus,
under the Canadian system, the ‘gatekeeper’ to the Tribunal process,
and the Tribunal can hear only those complaints which have been investigated by
the Commission and found to warrant an inquiry.

All complaints made to the Commission must be investigated, unless they are
outside jurisdiction, vexatious, or otherwise
invalid.[13] If a complaint is well
founded, the Commission may appoint a conciliator (independent of the
investigator) to assist the parties settle the
dispute.[14] If conciliation is
unsuccessful or inappropriate in the individual instance, the Commission (after
receiving the investigator’s report) may elect to either dismiss the
complaint, or to refer it to the Human Rights Tribunal for an inquiry.
The Commission then presents the case to the Tribunal, not on behalf of either
party, but in the manner it judges to be in the public
interest.[15] The parties themselves
are also entitled to put their
case.[16] Orders made by the
Tribunal are enforceable as orders of the Federal Court once they have been
registered, and may be reviewed by the Federal or Supreme Court on appeal.

There are few restrictions on standing to make a complaint to the Canadian
Human Rights Commission
. The law states that “any individual or
group of individuals having reasonable grounds for believing that a person is
engaging or has engaged in a discriminatory practice may file... a

The Commission itself is also empowered to bring a complaint on its own
initiative, although this power is only very rarely used. This, in part, is
because its role in assessing complaints and bringing them before the Tribunal
has provoked debate over whether it is possible for the Commission to
simultaneously play an adjudicative, investigative and advocative role without
being perceived as biased.[18] In
2000, a review of the Canadian Human Rights Act recommended retaining the
power of the Commission to initiate complaints, while reducing the potential for
conflict by downgrading its role as ‘gatekeeper’ to discrimination
complaints, and allowing all complaints to go directly before the Human
Rights Tribunal

The Human Rights Tribunal has affirmed the fact that an individual
does not need to be seeking a personal remedy to have standing to bring a
complaint under the Canadian Human Rights Act, “indeed the Act
does not require the complainant to be the victim of the alleged
discriminatory practice”
emphasis).[20] In such a case, the
Act allows the Tribunal to make orders which serve a ‘broader public
purpose’ rather than an individual need for compensation. It is also
possible for the court to award damages or compensation directly to the victim
of discrimination, even if they are not themselves a party to the

While the grounds for bringing a complaint are broad enough to allow standing
to those who are personally unaffected by discrimination, the Commission does
have a discretionary power to reject complaints where the victim of the
discrimination has not given their
consent.[22] It is also necessary in
most cases for there to be an identifiable, and not merely hypothetical, victim
of discrimination, although with respect to certain grounds of discrimination,
including advertising, employment policies and practices, hate messages and the
supply of goods and services, the Commission may accept complaints where no
individual victim has been
identified.[23] Despite its broad
powers, it is interesting to note that the Commission itself places emphasis on
collecting complaints from victims or their near associates rather than
non-involved ‘concerned

A complaint may be filed by an individual (including a legal person, such as
a corporation), or by a group of individuals. In the Bell Canada case,
the Tribunal interpreted this in light of the legislative intention to promote
the protection of rights, stating that: “It is our opinion that a
liberal and purposive interpretation of the Act supports a conclusion that a
union, acting to protect individuals rights as opposed to collective rights can
be said to be a ‘group of individuals’ under section 40(1) of the
[25] Thus a
non-incorporated association acting to protect the rights of individuals (rather
than its own ‘rights’ as an entity) will have standing under the

2.3 European Union

The Racial Equality Directive does not mandate any specific scheme for
the enforcement of race discrimination law, but it does set out some minimal
requirements relating to standing.

The Directive states that – to the extent it accords with national
practice – legal persons as well as individuals should be entitled to seek
redress on their own behalf when they suffer discrimination on the grounds of
the racial or ethnic origin of their
members.[26] With regards to the
rights of non-incorporated bodies, article 7 requires that “associations, organisations or other legal entities, which have, in
accordance with the criteria laid down by their national law, a legitimate
interest in ensuring that the provisions of this Directive are complied
must be allowed to be involved in the enforcement process either “on behalf or in support of the complainant, with his or her
. Non-incorporated associations with a ‘legitimate
interest’, must thus be allowed to appear on the victim’s behalf (as
they do in the Canadian and American system), or to provide
‘support’ to the individual conducting their own case, as in the
United Kingdom. Unlike incorporated bodies, the directive does not specifically
require that such organisations should be allowed to pursue a claim of
discrimination on their own behalf.

Under the Directive, all states are required to establish “a body or
bodies for the promotion of equal
.[27] As part of
their role, these bodies must be able to “provide independent
assistance to victims of discrimination in pursuing their complaints about
.[28] The
extent of such ‘support’ is left up to national discretion. As a
‘minimum standard’, the directive does not require that the
Commissions be authorised to initiate complaints on their own behalf, or to take
up and prosecute complaints on behalf of victims.

2.4 United Kingdom

The Race Relations Act 1976 in the United Kingdom creates two
different avenues of enforcement, each of which may operate independently of the
other. On the one hand, the Commission for Equality and Human Rights has
broad enforcement powers of its own initiative, which do not need to be
enlivened by a complaint. On the other hand, an individual may independently
bring an action before a court or tribunal, and need not bring the complaint
before the Commission unless they wish to receive the Commission’s advice
or assistance.

The Commission has a broad power to conduct an investigation into a suspected
breach of the Act.[29] Where such a
breach is found, the Commission may issue an ‘unlawful act notice’,
which requires the recipient to draw up an action plan specifying how future
acts of discrimination will be
avoided.[30] At any time during the
five years after such a plan has been formulated, the Commission may enforce
compliance with the plan by applying for an order from the
court.[31] Alternatively, the
Commission may negotiate an agreement with someone they believe to have
committed an unlawful act, which may also be enforced through the courts by
means of an injunction.[32] The
Commission will also have the power to seek an injunction to restrain a party
suspected of being about to commit a discriminatory

In certain areas of race-discrimination law, such as discriminatory
advertising or instructions or pressure to discriminate, the Commission has sole
responsibility to bring complaints before the relevant court or employment
tribunal, with suits by individuals being
excluded.[34] The Commission also
has a broad power to “institute or intervene in legal proceedings”
relevant to its functions, giving it the power both to bring its own legal
actions with regards to discrimination, and to intervene as an amicus in private
legal proceedings.[35] The
Commission also plays a role in enforcing the positive duties placed on public
bodies, which will be discussed further in chapter 7.

Except in the abovementioned areas of discriminatory advertising and
instructions or pressure to discriminate, private individuals may also have
standing to bring a civil action in response to discrimination. Under the Race Relations Act 1976, any ‘person’ is entitled to bring a
complaint against a respondent who “has committed an act against the
.[36] ‘Person’ is defined according to the Interpretation Act 1978 to include “a body of persons corporate or unincorporated”,
however there have been few cases of discrimination against non-natural persons
heard by the courts.[37] The
requirement of ‘an act against the complainant’ means that only
victims of discrimination (whether individual or corporate) have standing to
sue, and not other parties acting on their behalf.

In some cases, individuals may have standing to sue before any
‘act’ has been committed against them. Where a collective agreement
or rule with respect to employment is discriminatory, or an organisation has
discriminatory regulations regarding membership or the bestowal of professional
qualifications, an individual may seek to have the rules or regulations declared
invalid. In this case, an individual has standing if they can show that the
rule “may at some future time have an effect on him” or that
they are “genuinely and actively” seeking employment,
membership or a professional qualification from the discriminating

While a private complainant with sufficient resources or support may go
directly to the relevant court or tribunal, individuals may also elect to apply
to the Commission for assistance. The Commission will generally offer some
advice, and in rare cases may provide further assistance up to and including
full representation.[39] The
Commission can also arrange access to conciliation services for all interested

Although they are unable to bring representative actions on behalf of others,
organisations such as trade unions and anti-discrimination associations are
encouraged to play a role in supporting and advising victims of discrimination.
While the complaint must be brought by the individual victim, these
organisations may be involved in fact finding, preparing the case for litigation
and providing advice and legal
representation.[41] A large
proportion of the Commission’s budget is spent providing funding to such
community organisations and associations to increase their capacity to provide
this kind of advice and

2.5 United States

Unlike in the other jurisdictions examined, the United States does not have a
unified system for administering and enforcing federal racial discrimination
laws. Instead, a number of different bodies are responsible for different areas
of discrimination, such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which deals with employment discrimination, or the Department of
Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), which administers the laws with respect
to accommodation. In other areas, such as the provision of goods and services,
no commission exists, but the Attorney-General may play a role in enforcing the
law on behalf of the Federal Government.

2.5.1 Standing to Lodge a Complaint – Employment and Housing

In the field of employment, a complaint before the Commission may be
initiated in two ways. It may be filed ‘by or on behalf of’ a person
aggrieved, or by a member of the EEOC on its own initiative. Regardless of
whether it is initiated by the Commission or a private party, the complaint is
investigated by the Commission and, if found to be well founded, the Commission
attempts to effect conciliation between the
parties.[43] If conciliation is not
successful, the Commission (or the federal Attorney-General, if the respondent
is a government or government agency) may bring a civil action against the
discriminating party. The original complainant has the right to intervene in the
action, but does not have primary responsibility for running the

Only after a complaint has been terminated by the EEOC, or the Commission has
decided not to commence a civil action, can a private party sue on their own
behalf. A private claim may be brought against the respondent by “the
person... aggrieved”
by or on behalf of whom the complaint was lodged
or (where the complaint was made by a member of the Commission) any person the
complaint alleges was aggrieved by the unlawful
practice.[45] In some cases, a
person who was not involved in the initial complaint may still be allowed to
bring an action, or to join a class action, if their claim arrises out of
similar discriminatory treatment in a similar
timeframe.[46] In the case of
private actions for employment discrimination, the Commission or the
Attorney-General may be granted leave to intervene if they certify that the case “is of general public

The scheme for enforcing the anti-discrimination provisions regarding housing
operates in a broadly similar fashion, with the Secretary for Housing and Urban
Development fulfilling the role of the
Commission.[48] One key difference
is that it is non-compulsory, allowing a prospective litigant to elect to ignore
the complaint mechanism and go directly before the court. The housing
discrimination complaints system also allows for the charge brought by the
Secretary for HUD to be heard by a Housing Department administrative law judge,
unless either party specifically elects to have the case heard in the Federal

In both cases, a complaint can only be lodged with the Commission or the
Secretary by a ‘person aggrieved’ or another person acting on their
behalf. The term ‘person’ is broadly defined by both acts, including
one or more individuals, governments,
governmental agencies, political subdivisions, labor unions, partnerships,
associations, corporations, legal representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock
companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in
bankruptcy, or
”.[49] All these entities are therefore entitled to lodge complaints on their own
behalf and on behalf of others. In an employment discrimination
case, the complaint may be brought on behalf of a person whose identity is
disclosed only to the Commission, and not revealed to the opposite

2.5.2 Enforcement by the Attorney-General

While there are no commissions or other bodies empowered to hear complaints
with regards to the remaining grounds of discrimination, the Attorney-General
retains the power to take action to enforce the law. In some cases, such as with
regards to public facilities and education, the Attorney-General may act only
after receiving a complaint from an aggrieved individual or, in the case of
education, the parent or group of parents whose children are being discriminated
against.[51] In others cases, the
Attorney-General may initiate a complaint independently, such as when they
perceive a pattern or practice of restricting access to federally protected
goods and services or housing, or where they are required to take action in
order to prevent discrimination in voter

2.5.3 Standing to Initiate a Civil Action

With the exception of Executive Orders, many of which cannot be enforced by
private action, private litigation provides an alternative avenue of enforcement
for U.S. anti-discrimination

The anti-discrimination statutes prescribe few restrictions on
standing;[54] however a potential
litigant must satisfy the constitution standing test in order to bring an action
before the federal court. This test involves three parts: firstly, the person
must show that they have suffered “some threat or actual
resulting from the illegal action, such that they have
“a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy”; secondly, the
interest which is threatened must be “within the zone of interests to
be protected”
by the statute; and thirdly, the injury must be “likely to be redressed if the relief requested is

In general, the courts have interpreted these standing requirements quite
broadly. For instance, while non-black workers cannot object to a discriminatory
hiring policy of their employer on the grounds that it injures black employees,
they may be able to claim on the basis that the hiring policy injures their
legitimate interest in working in an inter-racial environment and otherwise
negatively impacts upon their working
conditions.[56] These requirements
may nonetheless restrict the parties who can seek to enforce the law, and the
types of remedies they can obtain. For instance, it has been held that an
ex-employee does not have standing to seek an injunction to force their previous
employer to change their current work practices, since the remedy does not
redress any particular harm to the interests of the

As well as being able to bring complaints before the EEOC and HUD,
corporations and non-incorporated associations, such as trade unions and
anti-discrimination associations may also have standing to bring a court action
once the complaint is terminated. An association may sue in its own right if its
own interests are affected by discrimination, however these interests are
generally confined to economic loss or diminution in membership, and do not
include damage to a group’s ‘ideological
interests’.[58] Alternatively,
an organisation may have standing as a representative of one or more of its
members.[59] In the latter case, it
is necessary for the members to have standing in their own right, and for the
interests which are threatened to be “germane to the
organisation’s purposes”
. Thus, for instance, a claim based on
conditions of employment may be ‘germane to the purposes’ of a trade
union,[60] while a claim of sex
discrimination would not be ‘germane to the purposes’ of an
organisation established to combat
racism.[61] It is also necessary to
demonstrate that “neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested
requires the participation of individual members”
. Thus, for instance,
a claim for individual compensation may require individual participation in
order to prove various elements of the claim, while a claim for general
declaratory or injunctive relief may

2.6 Key differences between Australian and International Regimes

One of the most notable differences between the Australian enforcement regime
and that of other jurisdictions, is that the Australian Human Rights and Equal
Opportunity Commission does not have standing to bring an action for
discrimination on its own initiative. While this is not one of the minimum
requirements laid down by E.U. law, the Commissions in each of the three
national jurisdictions examined all have the power to investigate and prosecute
racial discrimination without relying on individual complaints. This capacity of
the Commission to instigate complaints may be a valuable tool for combating
systemic discrimination, establishing legal precedent through test cases and
responding to situations where no individual has standing, or where the persons
affected lack the resources and initiative to make a complaint on their own
behalf. For these reasons, recent reviews of both the Canadian and British
legislation have strongly recommended that it be
retained.[63] At the same time, the
Canadian experience demonstrates that it is important that this power should be
consistent with the other roles of the Commission, particularly where the
Commission is involved in the adjudication of disputes. Since the adjudicative
role of the Australian Commission has, for constitutional reasons, significantly
declined in the years since the RDA was originally passed, this could
potentially allow scope for the Commission to adopt a larger advocacy role, with
greater power to investigate systemic issues and instigate legal action.

The jurisdictions also vary in the extent to which they allow persons who are
not affected by the discriminatory conduct to initiate complaints, either on
behalf of the victim of discrimination, or simply as a ‘concerned
citizen’ or interested bystander. The power to bring a representative
action on behalf of the complainant is quite broad in Canada and the U.S., where
representative organisations can both make complaints to the relevant Commission
and (in certain circumstances) have standing to appear before the court or
tribunal. In contrast, the U.K. allows such organisations to play only a
supportive role, providing resources and support to the complainant who must act
on their own behalf. Australia falls somewhere in between, allowing
representatives to bring complaints before the Commission, but allowing only the
affected individual to initiate legal action.

Almost no jurisdictions allow a non-involved bystander or witness to
discrimination to bring an action if they have not been personally affected and
do not represent the victim. Canada is something of an exception to this rule
however, as the flexibility of the Canadian complaint process gives the
Commission the discretion to accept this kind of complaint, when justice or the
public interest so require.

[1] For a list of grounds on which
a complaint may be terminated, see the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission Act
(Cth) 1986 s
[2]Human Rights and Equal
Opportunity Commission Act
(Cth) 1986 s 46P
[3]Human Rights and
Equal Opportunity Commission Act
(Cth) 1986 s 46P
[4]Human Rights and
Equal Opportunity Commission Act
(Cth) 1986 ss 46PB and 46PC(1). Note
that there are some additional conditions regarding class complaints contained
in ss 46PB and 46PC.
[5] Gibbs J, Australian Conservation Foundation v Commonwealth (1980) 146 CLR 493; as
noted in the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Federal
Discrimination Law 2005
(2005) at 215.

[6] Wilcox J, Executive Council of
Australian Jewry v Scully
(1998) 79 FCR 537 at 544-5; noted in the Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Federal Discrimination Law 2005 (2005) at 216.

[7] Mason J, Koowarta v
, (1982) 153 CLR 236; noted in the Human Rights and Equal
Opportunity Commission, Federal Discrimination Law 2005 (2005) at
[8] Wilcox J, Executive
Council of Australian Jewry v Scully
(1998) 79 FCR 537 at 548, noted in the
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Federal Discrimination Law
(2005) at 219.
[9]Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act (Cth) 1986 ss 3
and 46PO(1).
Discrimination Act
1975 (Cth) s 20 (1)(e); see also Human Rights
and Equal Opportunity Commission Act
(Cth) 1986 s
[11]Human Rights and
Equal Opportunity Commission Act
(Cth) 1986 s11(1)(f) for inquiries
into acts done on behalf of the Commonwealth and s31(b) for inquiries into
discrimination in
[12]Human Rights
and Equal Opportunity Commission Act
(Cth) 1986 s
[13]Canadian Human
Rights Act
, RS 1985, c H-6, s
[14]Canadian Human
Rights Act
, RS 1985, c H-6, ss 47 and
[15]Canadian Human Rights
, RS 1985, c H-6, s
[16]Canadian Human Rights
, RS 1985, c H-6, s
[17]Canadian Human
Rights Act
, RS 1985, c. H-6, s
[18]Canadian Human Rights
Act Review Panel, Promoting Equality: A New Vision (2000) at
chapter 9, (accessed 4/10/07). See also the litigation over perceived bias in Bell
Canada v. CTEA, CEP and Femmes Action and the CHRC
(2 November 2000), No.
T-890-99 (FCA).
[19] Canadian
Human Rights Act Review Panel, Promoting Equality: A New Vision (2000) at chapter 9, (accessed 4/10/07).
[20]Brigitte Lavoie v. Treasury Board of Canada 2007 CHRT 3, (accessed 24/7/07).
[21]Canadian Human Rights Act, RS 1985, c. H-6, s 53(2); see also Groupe
D’Aide et D’Information Sur le Harcèlement Sexuel au Travail
de la Province de Québec Inc. v Barbe
2003 CHRT 24 at para
[22]Canadian Human Rights
, RS 1985, c. H-6, s
[23]Canadian Human
Rights Act
, RS 1985, c. H-6, s 40(5)(b); see also the discussion of this
section in: Canadian Human Rights Act Review Panel, Promoting Equality: A New
(2000) at chapter 14 (accessed 4/9/07).
[24] See e.g.,
Canadian Human Rights Commission, Filing a Complaint (2003):
“Usually the person who has suffered from the discrimination files the
complaint but, in certain cases, it may be filed by a third party, such as a
relative or a collective bargaining agent” (accessed 6/10/07).
[25] Communications, Energy & Paperworkers Union, Femmes-Action v. Bell
, Ruling No. 1, Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, File No. T503/2098 at
p. 4 (accessed 3/8/07).
[26]Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of
equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin
[2000] OJ L180/22, cl 16.
[27] Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal
treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin
[2000] OJ
L180/22, art 13(1).
[28]Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of
equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin
[2000] OJ L180/22, art
[29]Equality Act
(UK) c 3, s 20. Note that the references here are to the new Commission
for Equality and Human Rights, with the equivalent powers of the Commission for
Racial Equality to be found in the Race Relations Act 1976 (UK) c 74,
parts VII and VIII.
[30]Equality Act 2006 (UK) c 3, s 21. Note that these were referred to as
‘non-discrimination notices’ under the Race Relations Act
(U.K.) c 74, s 58.
[31]Equality Act 2006 (UK) c 3, s
[32]Equality Act 2006 (UK) c 3, s 24.
Act 2006
(UK) c 3, s
[34]Equality Act
(UK) c 3, s 25.
[35]Equality Act 2006 (UK) c 3, s
[36]Race Relations Act
(UK) c 74, s 54(1)(a) and s
[37] Interpretation
Act 1978
(UK) c 30, schedule 1; see also commentary in O’Cinneide C, United Kingdom Country Report on Measures to Combat Discrimination (2007)
at 45 (accessed 3/8/07).
Relations Act 1976
(UK) c 74, ss 72A and
[39]Equality Act
(UK) c 3, s 28.
[40]Equality Act 2006 (UK) c 3, s
[41] Bodrogi B, ‘Legal
Standing, the Practical Experience of a Hungarian Organisation’ (2007) 5 European Anti-Discrimination Law Review 23 at 25 (comparing UK and
Hungarian practice).
[42] See
‘Getting Results’ funding program, (accessed 31/7/07).
[43] 42 USC
§ 2000e-5(b).
[44] 42 USC
§ 2000e-5(f)(1).
[45] 42 USC
§ 2000e-5(f)(1).
[46] See
discussion of Calloway v. Partners National Health
Plans 986 F.2d 446, 61 FEP 550 (11th Cir. 1993) in Larson L,
Employment Discrimination (2006) at
[47] 42 USC §
[48] See 42 USC
§§ 3610-3614.
[49] 42
USC § 2000e(a); see similarly (with some variation) 42 USC §
[50] 29 CFR
[51] 42 USC
§§ 2000b(a) and
[52] 42 USC §§
2000a-5, 3614 and 1971(c).
[53] See e.g. §§ 2000a-3, 2000b-2 and
[54] In some cases the
statute refers to a ‘person aggrieved’, which has been interpreted
by the courts as intending to allowing as broad a standing as is
constitutionally possible. See Hackett v.
McGuire Bros., Inc.
, 445 F.2d 442, 446, 3 FEP 648, 650 (3d Cir. 1971) as
discussed in Larson L, Employment Discrimination (2006) at s
[55] Larson
L, Employment Discrimination (2006) at s
[56]Faulk v. Home Oil Co., 173 F.R.D. 311, 74
FEP 807 (M.D. Ala. 1997) as cited Larson L, Employment
(2006) at s
[57]Reese v. Batesville Casket Co. 25 FEP 1472
(D.D.C. 1981), as cited Larson L, Employment Discrimination (2006) at s
[58] Gutman J. Federal Practice Manual for Legal Aid Attorneys (2006) at
chapter 3 para 1 D 3 (accessed 1/8/07).
[59]Warth et al v Seldin et al 422 US 490 at
511, referenced in Larson L, Employment Discrimination (2006)
at 78.02(2).
[60] Garcia v Spun Steak Co. (1993, CA9 Cal)
998 F2d 1480, 93 CDOS 5408,
[61]Cox v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 47 FEP 685
(D.D.C. 1987) as discussed in Larson L, Employment
(2006) at s
[62]Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
, 432 US 333, 343, 97 S. Ct. 2434, 53 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1977) as citied Larson L, Employment Discrimination (2006) at
[63] Canadian
Human Rights Act Review Panel, Promoting Equality: A New Vision (2000) at Chapter 9, (accessed 4/10/07) and B. Hepple, M. Coussey and T. Choudhury, Equality: A
New Framework
Report of the Independent Review of the Enforcement
of UK Anti-Discrimination Legislation
(2000) at 4.26, as cited in Harrington
J, ‘Making Sense of Equality: A Review of the Hepple Report’ (2001)
64(5) Modern Law Review 757 at 764.