Social Justice Report 2001: Chapter 2: Mutual obligation, welfare reform and Indigenous participation: a human rights perspective

Social Justice Report 2001

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Chapter 2: Mutual obligation, welfare reform and Indigenous participation: a human rights perspective

Mutual obligation, welfare reform and Indigenous participation: a human rights perspective

Mutual obligation and welfare reform

Mutual obligation – some general concerns

Coercion and conditionality

Penalties for breaching

Mutual obligation and equality

Mutual obligation, practical reconciliation and Indigenous welfare reform

Mutual obligation, welfare reform and practical reconciliation – Indigenous-specific concerns

The context of Indigenous marginalisation

Mutual obligation and Indigenous cultural values

Conclusions – Indigenous empowerment and effective participation

Mutual obligation, welfare reform and Indigenous participation: a human rights perspective

In recent years a mutual obligation approach has been adopted to reform public policy on welfare and employment issues. There has been much discussion about the applicability of this approach within an Indigenous policy context. It is seen by many as consistent with Indigenous cultural values such as reciprocity and an emphasis on community, as well as suggesting an antidote to the damage caused by intergenerational poverty, of which long-term welfare dependency and a crippling short-term local cash economy are often features. This chapter evaluates the appropriateness of a mutual obligation approach to addressing the deeply entrenched and severe disadvantage and marginalisation faced by Indigenous people from the perspective of human rights standards. There exists in Australia a history of seeking administrative solutions to issues related to Indigenous economic marginalisation. We should not rush to a wholesale acceptance of a mutual obligation policy approach on the basis of a superficial attractiveness and apparent consistency with Indigenous cultural values or for reasons of political expediency. Consideration must be given to whether such an approach actually empowers Indigenous people and communities to take control of their lives and be self-determining. On this basis, we must question the ease with which an emphasis on ‘welfare dependency’ and ‘self reliance’ has distracted attention from the broader spectrum of issues related to the economic marginalisation faced by Indigenous people.

Mutual obligation and welfare reform

A mutual obligation approach has formed the philosophical basis for reform of the welfare system by the present Federal Government since its election in 1996. The mutual obligation principle asserts that the provision of government assistance is not simply a matter of right or entitlement, but something that must be reciprocated by the citizen through meeting a range of obligations and responsibilities. In the context of welfare reform, the onus has shifted from the State’s obligation to provide income support for those citizens unable to exercise their right to work (temporarily or otherwise) to the obligation of the unemployed citizen to perform certain duties - such as seeking work, undertaking training or accepting temporary employment - in exchange for this support. In a speech delivered to the National Press Club, titled ‘The future of welfare in the 21st century’, the Minister for Family and Community Services outlined the government’s rationale for a mutual obligation approach to welfare reform as follows:

A modern safety net is not about blaming the victim, or penalising or punishing disadvantaged people. Nor is it necessarily about more government intervention or throwing money at problems. It is about helping people avoid and move out of welfare dependency and giving them real opportunities. And, it is about people on government payments accepting responsibility and an obligation to help themselves by making a contribution to the economy and society as much as they can. [1]

This approach has its origins in the liberal democratic notion of a social contract existing between individual citizen and state. [2] Under this contract, ‘all members of society have obligations to sacrifice certain individual freedoms in the pursuit of collective advantage and mutual benefi [3] >[3] In mutual obligation policies an understanding of this contract is being re-worked in terms of individuals’ obligations ‘to live off their own (or their family’s) labours, to be self-reliant rather than reliant on others and to avoid being a burden to [4]

This approach is accompanied by an understanding that some form of active participation, geared toward developing greater ‘self reliance’, is preferable to ‘welfare passivity’ or ‘dependency’. This shift in public policy has been presented as a necessary development in the face of social and economic change that has meant the State is unable to sustain the former standards of its social security net due to factors as diverse as the impact of rapid globalisation, advances in technology and an ageing population.

Many of the principles which underpin this approach are imported from public policy developments, characterised as a ‘Third Way in Politics’, in other western democracies. These include ‘workfare’ introduced by President Clinton in the United States in 1996 and the offer of a ‘New Deal’ to the unemployed by British Prime Minister Tony Blair in the United Kingdom in 1997. Many of the principles which underpin this approach are imported from public policy developments, characterised as a ‘Third Way in Politics’, in other western democracies. These include ‘workfare’ introduced by President Clinton in the United States in 1996 and the offer of a ‘New Deal’ to the unemployed by British Prime Minister Tony Blair in the United Kingdom in 1997.

Australia’s social security system has always had some degree of compulsion built into the receipt of income support since its introduction in the 1940s, such as requirements that recipients engage in job-seeking or some other form of approved activity in return. However, since the late 1980s there has been greater public acceptance of the notion that obligations should be required of benefit recipients, accompanied by increases in the level of conditionality of income support programs.

Following a major review of the welfare system in 1988, the Hawke and Keating governments introduced a range of modifications to labour market programs to ensure greater compliance by income support recipients through targeting and providing incentives to encourage work and reduce welfare dependence. This emphasis on ‘reciprocal obligation’ was crystallised in the 1994 white paper on employment, Working Nation of which the Job Compact for the long-term unemployed was central. Through this initiative, the Government sought to provide the long-term unemployed with a guaranteed job within 6-12 months along with a program of targeted assistance. This was accompanied by high penalties for unemployed people who did not accept a reasonable job offer.

When the Coalition came into government in 1996 Working Nation was replaced by more market-oriented initiatives which included the downsizing of labour market programs, deregulation of the training market, and privatisation of the employment assistance service with the introduction of Job Network from May 1998. In accordance with the mutual obligation principle, tighter requirements were introduced for the receipt of benefits and harsher penalties enforced for failure to comply (such as the ‘breaching’ of the activity test).

A major pillar of this approach has been the Work for the Dole (WFTD) program, which was piloted in November 1997, then steadily increased from 25 000 places in 1㬆99 to 50 000 places a year by July 2000. The WFTD program requires income support recipients to ‘actively seek work, constantly strive to improve their competitiveness in the labour market, and give something back to the community that supports them’. [6]

It encourages greater self-reliance and specifies three broad classes of activities - employment and community participation, training and intensive assistance - for fulfilment of mutual obligation requirements. From 1 July 2000 all income support recipients were required to sign a ‘Preparing for Work Agreement’ that stipulates commitments to undertake activities to seek work.

In September 1999 the Minister for Family and Community Services announced the government’s intention to conduct a wide-ranging review to examine such issues such as inefficiencies of the welfare system, welfare dependency (especially intergenerational), and ways of countering the problems that result from a reliance on income support. [7] On 17 August 2000 the Reference Group on Welfare Reform delivered its final repo Participation Support for a More Equitable Society (the ‘McClure Report’).

The report found that the existing social support system was no longer appropriate to the current social and economic environment, and that it was failing those it was intended to support. It argued that the system needed to be transformed to increase people’s opportunities for social and economical participation to avoid the creation of long-term disadvantage and intergenerational cycles of joblessness. Principal failings of the current social system identified were: fragmented service delivery arrangements with inadequate participation goals; overly complex and rigid categories of pensions and allowances; inadequate incentives for participation and inadequate rewards for work; and insufficient recognition of participation. The report put forward five inter-related features for effective reform and development of a participation support system:

• Individualised service delivery – income support is to promote social and economic participation consistent with individual capacities and circumstances, and service delivery will assist individuals in identifying and achieving participation goals;

• A simpler income support structure – development of a ‘dynamic and holistic system that will recognise and respond to people’s changing circumstances over their life cycle and within their own family and communit [8]

• Incentives and financial assistance – to encourage and enable participation in line with people’s differing circumstances and the cost of participation;

• Mutual obligations – ‘underpinned by the concept of social obligations. Governments, businesses, communities and individuals all have roles. Governments will have a responsibility to continue to invest significant resources to support participation. Employers and communities will have a responsibility to provide opportunities and support. Income support recipients will have a responsibility to take-up the opportunities provided by government, business and community, consistent with community values and their own capacity’; [9] and

• Social partnerships – a key strategy for building community capacity to increase social and economic participation in which business and the community are to play a major role through four processes: community economic development, fostering micro-businesses, community business partnerships and social entrepreneurship. This strategy seeks to go beyond a traditional philanthropic or fundraising approach to invest genuine social capital (stronger networks, trust and shared values) in communities.

The government responded in part in December 2000 by committing to build a new welfare system that retains the social safety net for the disadvantaged but provides incentives for increased economic and social participation. The government endorsed the broad direction of the McClure Report and its five principles, including development of ‘a simplified welfare system that encourages people to participate in mutual obligation activities according to their ability’. [10] It also committed to making welfare reform one of the highest funding priorities of the 2001-02 Budget and to developing a consultative forum, with representatives from the welfare, business and community sectors, to gain views on the design and implementation of future measures before the Budget. They did not, however, give specific details of a budgetary investment to support the report.

While some aspects of the Government’s response received cautious support from the Australian Council of Social Services (ACOSS), President Michael Raper criticised it on the grounds that:

People had a right to expect a guaranteed funding package (not just a promise to give it ‘high priority’ in the coming Budget); a commitment to increase inadequate payment rates; a guarantee of effective employment for all long-term jobless people; and a reduction in the harsh penalties. [11]

To date the welfare reform package (‘Australians Working Together’) that formed the centrepiece of Budget 2001 represents the government’s most substantial response to the McClure Report. ‘Australians Working Together’ included modifications of existing government employment assistance and mutual obligation policies to improve personalised assessment and service, and to increase training and work experience opportunities as well as earnings and incentives to work. It introduced initiatives in the following areas: a Working Credit to support part-time and temporary casual work; a Personal Support Programme to assist those whose personal problems deterred them from finding work; and a Transition to Work Programme to help parents, carers and mature job seekers returning to the workforce. There were also enhancements to the Intensive Assistance scheme, extra WFTD places and opportunities for community work, and new Training Credits for jobseekers to gain work-related skills.

The ‘Australians Working Together’ package committed $1.7 billion over a four-year period to welfare reform, with much of the expenditure to begin in July 2002. The budget also estimated a ‘claw back’ of $800 million from this figure, with the implication that this money would come from people moving off welfare payments. However, in light of projected increases in unemployment figures, the money is more likely to come from penalties. As it stands, the package falls short of the $1 billion recommended by McClure to address welfare reform over the next four years. ACOSS estimates indicate that a budget commitment of $4 billion over the next 2 years is necessary to achieve the structural change for genuine welfare reform. [12] There are as yet no indications as to whether the government intends to implement the McClure Report’s recommendations in their entirety.

Mutual obligation – some general concerns

There are a range of concerns about the current approach to mutual obligation and welfare reform. This section will consider those for which the impact is often exacerbated in the case of Indigenous people. The following will consider mutual obligation within the framework of practical reconciliation, the broader context of addressing Indigenous disadvantage and Indigenous specific welfare and employment programs.

Coercion and conditionality

Article 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights emphasises the obligation of the State to support the individual’s right to work in equitable, non-coercive terms, by requiring the State to ‘recognize the right to work, which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts’ and to take appropriate steps to safeguard this right. Article 6(2) also provides that the State must take steps ‘to achieve the full realization of this right [including] technical and vocational guidance and training programmes, policies and techniques to achieve steady economic, social and cultural development and full and productive employment’ while doing so ‘under conditions safeguarding fundamental political and economic freedoms to the individual’.

The mutual obligation approach has been criticised for the conditionality and coerciveness of the contract that it creates between the State and citizen, which results in an unbalanced and inequitable focus on the obligations of the unemployed. [13] To ensure equity, the justness of the mutual obligation contract needs to be established. This means that the terms on which the State institution places obligations on the income support recipients in exchange for rights to welfare entitlements must be fair. The equitable treatment of income support recipients should also be ensured through enabling them to exercise a reasonable level of consent in accepting the conditions for receipt of entitlements. That is, the relationship should not be a coercive one: the income support recipient should be in a position to have ‘voluntarily accepted the benefits of the arrangement or taken advantage of the opportunities it offers to further one’s inte [14] However, rather than providing the unemployed with a greater level of choice and opportunity to realise what should be a right to work, the aim of the current mutual obligation policy is to:

increase the attractiveness of work compared to welfare through a combination of welfare conditionality and in-work benefits. The former is designed to modify the behaviour of social security recipients (possibly through coercive measures) in order to make them more prepared to seek (paid) work, while the latter is intended to make the transition to work more financially attractive to them. The differences arise in the scope and severity of conditionality and in the nature of the tax, benefit and labour market changes designed to increase the attractiveness of work. [15]

Anna Yeatman has described the mutual obligation contract between unemployed citizen and the State as ‘a contract between unequals where the function of this inequality is to provide a paternalistic direction to the individual who is thus positioned as the client of the more powerful party to the contract.’ [16] The harsh penalties incurred through the breaching of current income support requirements provides an example of how increased levels of coerciveness have resulted in the inequitable treatment of unemployed citizens by the State.

Penalties for breaching

Breaching refers to the penalties imposed on income support recipients (Newstart and Youth Allowance) who fail to meet the Activity Test and other administrative requirements. Ongoing payment of benefits is dependent on meeting the Activity Test, a threshold set to indicate that the unemployed person has made reasonable efforts to find work or to improve their employment opportunities. The Activity Test includes requirements that unemployed people apply for up to 10 jobs per fortnight (subject to some discretion on behalf of Centrelink officers), and participate in mutual obligation activities such as WFTD, Green Corps or the Job Placement, Employment and Training Programme.

Penalties may be imposed for not meeting requirements such as attending an interview, contacting a Job Network member within 7-14 days, declaring earnings correctly from employment and voluntary unemployment. [17] Failure to meet administrative requirements such as return of a review form also constitutes breaching. Penalties for breaching the Activity Test mean a reduction or cancellation of payment – the rate of reduction relates to whether a breach has occurred in the last two years. At present, the rate of payment reduction is 18% for 26 weeks for a first breach; 24% reduction for 26 weeks for a second; and 8 weeks with no payment for a third breach. All administrative breaches incur a 16% reduction for 13 we [18] On this basis, unemployed people can face penalties of between $837 and $1,431 for breaches such as the failure to attend an appointment.

ACOSS points out that these penalties are ‘disproportionate and unjustifiably harsh compared to those applied by Magistrate Courts for criminal convictions’. [19] Their research also found that breaches were sometimes applied without seeking a ‘reasonable excuse’ from income support recipients. Breaches can be overturned through appeal, which often means greater financial hardship while the person seeks to justify his or her situation.

Research conducted by ACOSS has shown an ‘explosion’ of Activity Test breaches over the past three years, with a 310% increase since June 1998 (and a particularly high rate of increase during the eight months from July 2000). Overall, they estimated ‘approximately 349,100 breaches applied for the 2000-01 year represent[ing] a 189% increase in the number of penalties applied in the three years from June 1㬂. [20] During 2000-1, an estimated total of $258.8 million in penalties was imposed on unemployed people:

This amount represents a cost to the individuals penalised, their families and also the broader community that is called on to provide additional support during periods of reduced or no payment. While this amount is also a ‘saving’ to the Government, it comes at the cost of tremendous hardship and increased poverty among unemployed people, as well as the extra cost that is passed on to charities and community welfare agencies. [21]

In addition, ACOSS and others have drawn attention to the burden that these harsh and inequitable penalties place on already disadvantaged jobseekers, including ‘homeless people; people with mental illness; jobseekers with drug and alcohol related problems; people with literacy and numeracy problems; people who have acquired brain injuries; young people; and Indigenous Australians’. [22]

Research conducted by the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR) and commissioned by the Department of Family and Community Services (DFACS) indicated that during the period June 1997 to March 1998 national breach rates were ‘consistently higher among indigenous identifiers by a factor of about one-and-a-half in relation to activity test breaching and a factor of two in relation to administrative breaching’. [23] Factors identified for the higher rates of Indigenous breaching included lower levels of literacy and higher rates of mobility amongst the Indigenous population; lack of confidence dealing with bureaucracies; a lower propensity to seek appeal or review of breaching; inadequate postal services to some remote and rural areas; lack of appreciation of difficulties for Indigenous people seeking employment; unfamiliarity with Centrelink teleservices; and CDEP and Abstudy administrative issues.

The study further identified features of income support and employment assistance administration such as ‘general tensions and ambiguities in income support administration, different office cultures and roles, the cultural and social content of rules and procedures and the diversity of the unemployed’ [24] [24] as having significant impacts on Indigenous benefit recipients. A recent DFACS paper stated that in 1999 to 2000, ‘almost 1 in 2 Indigenous people in some centres – notably in some of Sydney’s western and inner suburbs have in [25] which demonstrates the continuing vulnerability of the Indigenous unemployed to the current penalty system.

The penalty system for breaching demonstrates one of the more damaging implications of mutual obligation policy. It holds unemployed citizens chiefly responsible for their employment status while downplaying the accountability of the State to generate the circumstances for increased employment opportunities for its citizens. [26]

This level of coercion at the individual level also stands in marked contrast to the ambiguity and lack of enforcement of the obligations of business and other sectors of the community.

The McClure Report’s commitments to mutual obligations underpinned by social obligations and social partnerships entail recognition of the importance of obligations and responsibilities ‘across the whole community, not just between the government (on behalf of the community) and the individual in receipt of income support’, [27] 27">[27] including corporate entities such as business enterprises and tra [28] 28">[28] At the same time a strong emphasis remains on ensuring the contribution of (unemployed) individuals to the ‘community’: ‘Income support recipients will have a responsibility to take-up the opportunities provided by government, business and community consistent with community values an [29]

However, given that individuals at the bottom of the labour market face harsh penalties for ‘breaching’, it is reasonable to request that forms of compliance and regulation be applied to ensure that business meets its social obligations. Some strategies suggested to increase corporate mutual responsibility include: tax breaks, preferred tendering to businesses that, for example, recruit or train Indigenous people, and bonus payments from government to businesses that contribute to the community. [30] The McClure Report recommends:

… establish[ing] a national framework of triple bottom line (social, environmental and economic) auditing for the corporate sector sponsored by the Prime Minister’s Community Business Partnership with business organizations and professional associations. [31]

In considering options for extending obligations and responsibilities across the community, the viability of developing community capacity and enhancing social capital through social partnerships involving business stakeholders also needs to be assessed. [32] Notions of forming partnerships are often largely based on assumptions of good will, and the inequalities between business and other players, including issues such as the precarious position of some disadvantaged communities and whether they can offer business adequate incentives to work with them, need careful consideration.

Mutual obligation and equality

A formal equality approach is evident in aspects of mutual obligation policies for the Indigenous and mainstream communities. Much mutual obligation discourse operates on the assumption that all citizens are on a more or less equal footing, that there is little difference between their circumstances, and that most people exercise a degree of choice in regard to their current situation, whether employed or in receipt of income support. This outlook is implicit, for example, in the Prime Minister’s delineation of self reliance as one of the chief values of the Australian Way:

The first of these principles goes to the heart of the Australian ethos, to the heart of our national self-image and to the hopes we hold for ourselves and for our children – Self Reliance. We believe, as we always have, that ‘the only real freedom is a brave acceptance of unclouded individual responsibility’. And in making policy since we took office, that encouragement of self reliance, of giving people choice, of rewarding those who can and do take responsibility for themselves and their families has been at the forefront of our efforts. [33]

As Yeatman comments: ‘the new discourse of self-reliance is non-discriminatory and egalitarian in its assumption that each individual would prefer to be self-reliant if they could be.’ [34] This focus:

implicitly assumes that social and economic change should be driven through changes in the circumstances, skills and opportunities of individuals. Equally, it assumes that the wider social problems which are associated with welfare dependency can be addressed through changing the circumstances of individual lives. [35]

To this end, the McClure Report, for example, proposed ‘a model of individualised service delivery’ that ‘offers targeted assistance based on an individual’s needs, capacities and circumstances’ to ‘enable individuals with very different levels of need for assistance to be streamed into levels of service intervention based on their capacity for economic and social participation.’ To this end, the McClure Report, for example, proposed ‘a model of individualised service delivery’ that ‘offers targeted assistance based on an individual’s needs, capacities and circumstances’ to ‘enable individuals with very different levels of need for assistance to be streamed into levels of service intervention based on their capacity for economic and social participation.’

To date there has been a lack of sensitivity to the specific circumstances of individuals in the application of measures that support the notion that unemployed citizens would prefer to be self-reliant, but lack the effective capacity in terms of training, education, and expertise. [37] The educative aspect of programs such as Work for the Dole, for example, has been found to possess limited relevance to furthering the employability of income support recipients, which makes the purpose and value of increasing obligations for individuals in addition to existing obligations to seek employment questionable. [38] The scheme lacks ‘substantial employment experience in mainstream jobs (which was offered by Jobstart), relevant vocational training (which was offered by Jobskills), and ongoing personal support (which is offered by Intensive Assistance providers) [39]

Feedback from participants in an independent study of WFTD revealed that: ‘The large majority of participants had not only experienced paid employment, but many had kept a job for twelve months or more in the past. This calls into question the program’s objective of creating a work culture and teaching basic work habits’. [40] After completion of the program, 80% of participants were still unemployed five months later.

Other data recently released on WFTD’s employment outcomes indicated that:

… only 27% of former participants were in employment 3 months later. This rises to 33% if those who moved on to other employment schemes (such as Job network services) are excluded from the figures. However, this is still a poor outcome, compared with former ‘Working Nation’ labour market programs that also provided paid employment experience: Jobstart (59%) and Jobskills (41%), and Intensive Assistance provided through the Job Network (36% in 1999-2000). [41]

An ACOSS analysis of the WFTD scheme has suggested that the ‘main reason its poor outcomes is that … [it] was not designed in the first place to help people into employment’. [42] 42">[42] It suggests that rather than continuing to fund WTFD the government deploy more funds to Intensive Assistance through the Job Network to ‘organise more substantial paid employment experience in mainstream jobs (both with and without formal training) for those who need it. After all, the ultimate goal is to get people working for wages, not working [43]

The compulsion for the unemployed to work or fulfil some equivalent activity on the grounds of their obligations to the taxpayers is also questionable given that most income support recipients have been regular income taxpayers at some stage or may be in the future and already pay a range of other taxes such as the goods and services tax. The notion of the ability to pay tax as the defining aspect of community membership is highly reductive in any case, as it suggests a certain priority or status for economic participation over other forms of contribution to the community.

The application of this ‘non-discriminatory and egalitarian’ concept of the citizen to extend self-reliance and active citizenship to all social groups – that is, the expectation of active participation in mutual obligation of all adult individuals, including women, Indigenous and disabled peoples – has the potential to increase the injustices and inequities experienced by the disadvantaged, as illustrated by the impact of breaching. [44] Kinnear notes that:

As a general principle, the idea that members of society should cooperate to secure the mutual advantage of all is reasonable, compelling and vital to social justice. But to single out certain groups, especially disadvantaged groups, for special and mandatory obligations is a distortion of this principle, especially in circumstances where the disadvantaged groups have limited or no choice. [45]

The lack of employment opportunities available for certain groups means that these policies are likely to be harsher in their impact on them than on other sections of society. [46] Fincher and Saunders highlight the impact of locational disadvantage:

The types of citizen our governments, media, even educational institutions celebrate as successes are: hard-working, in paid employment, entrepreneurial, efficient, so that they are self-funding and self-helping and not drawing from the public payroll for pensions or allowances. The types of locations that benefit (though only implicitly as Australian governments exhibit limited regional or spatial thinking and planning) are those that are the places of work and residence of those citizens. These locations are primarily metropolitan… Paid employment is apparently to be ever more synonymous with citizenship in Australia. [47]

Other significant factors contributing to increasing poverty and inequality – and this is highly significant for Indigenous Australians – include lack of education and employment skills, and family history of unemployment or precarious employment. Peter Travis argues that lack of employability is a more significant indicator of poverty than low income:

In principle, low income can be easily remedied. The combination of low skills and low participation in either education or the labour market is far more difficult to alter. This is the basis for the concern that leads commentators to use terms like “marginalisation” or “social exclusion”. [48]

The focus of government employment policy at the level of the individual ignores the need for, or possibility of, systemic change including attention to structural inequalities that might generate more employment opportunities. The emphasis on tackling welfare dependency can also serve to obscure the impact of these issues:

If Australia faces a “crisis” of increasing numbers of individuals who are trapped in cycles of demoralised welfare dependency, this may justify a hard-line response of conditional benefits and mandatory individual mobilisation. If, on the other hand, the problem is one of increasing inequality, structural poverty and entrenched disadvantage then the solutions should focus on the reduction of inequality and the redistribution of wealth. [49]

As UnitingCare’s report on poverty observes, ‘not only does work not necessarily lift people out of poverty but there are also not enough jobs for all those who are looking for work’. [50] 50">[50] A comparison of the number of unemployed persons and duration of unemployment against job vacancies Australia-wide indicated that ‘even in a perfect labour market where skills exactly matched job vacancies, there would still be more than 6 unemployed people for every [51]

Mutual obligation, practical reconciliation and Indigenous welfare reform

Since 1996 the introduction of a mutual obligation approach to welfare reform has been accompanied by a shift in the basis of Indigenous policy making in general to what has subsequently been termed ‘practical reconciliation’. The introductory chapter gave some discussion of the practical reconciliation approach and a more detailed examination is provided in Chapter 6 of this report. [52] Practical reconciliation focuses on countering issues relating to Indigenous disadvantage in the areas of education, health, housing, and employment as opposed to other issues which are said not to not lead to concrete change and therefore to be ‘symbolic’.

Practical reconciliation and mutual obligation fit hand in glove. In the most recent budget statement, Our path together , the Minister for Reconciliation and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs describes the Government’s approach as focused on ‘practical measures aimed at increasing self reliance, breaking the cycle of welfare dependency and improving the health of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peo [53] 53">[53] Previous budget statements have similarly noted, for example, the commitment of the Government to assisting ‘more indigenous people to break away from welfare dependency and in return [improve] their social circumstances in areas like employment, housing, health and the criminal j [54]

But while mutual obligation can be seen as integral to the process of practical reconciliation, to date there has been very little focus on the Indigenous-specific dimensions of welfare dependency in debates about general welfare reform and mutual obligation.

This has been one of the main criticisms directed towards the McClure Report and the government’s response to it, by a range of Indigenous and non-Indigenous commentators. Both the McClure Report and the government response have been seen as providing a limited, tokenistic consideration of the specific issues facing Indigenous people caught in the welfare system. [55] This is despite the extent of Indigenous contact with the income support system, and with Indigenous people being unemployed at over two and a half times the rate of the general populati [56] This figure is significantly higher if Indigenous participants in CDEP schemes are counted as unemployed.

The McClure Report emphasised that given the level of Indigenous disadvantage, systemic discrimination by business towards Indigenous people needs to be addressed and further strategies for private sector employment developed. In addition to targeting assistance to individuals, it suggested the establishment of local job creation schemes, local and regional development initiatives, small business development assistance and group enterprise development assistance. [57] The McClure Report cited the Gwydir Valley Indigenous Employment Strategy as an example of a ‘successful collaboration of Commonwealth and local governments, industry associations and local businesses [58]

The McClure Report has been criticised for its lack of consideration of some of the contextual factors affecting Indigenous employment status, such as the limited employment and regional development prospects in certain rural and remote areas. [59] It does not give any detailed discussion of issues concerning the cultural appropriateness for Indigenous people of the emphasis on individualised service delivery central to the report’s proposed participation support system.

The key emphasis of the government’s policy approach to Indigenous employment and welfare issues is on increasing Indigenous participation in the formal economy, especially within the private sector. Government policy seeks to achieve this largely through the Indigenous Employment Policy (IEP) and the Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) Scheme.

The Indigenous Employment Policy is the centre-piece of this approach. It commenced on 1 July 1999 and consists of three elements, namely the Indigenous Employment Programme, Indigenous Small Business Fund and a package of measures to improve outcomes from mainstream programs (such as Job Network and Work for the Dole). The Indigenous Employment Programme includes: Wage Assistance, an incentive to help Indigenous job seekers find long-term employment by giving credit breaks to employers; bonuses for CDEP participants placed in outside employment for at least 20 hours a week; a project to place more Indigenous Australians in the private sector; structured training and employment projects; a foundation to utilise voluntary service to Indigenous communities; and a national Indigenous cadetship program.

The Indigenous Small Business Fund was established to support the development of Indigenous businesses and enterprises. It seeks to improve Indigenous access to business preparation and support through providing business management programs, and through skills development programs such as mentoring, networking, advisory services and market development. Individuals can also apply for assistance to develop a business plan. It is jointly funded through contributions over a three-year period of $6 million from the Office of Small Business of the Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business and $5 million from ATSIC.

The third aspect of the Indigenous Employment Policy instigates measures to improve the accessibility of mainstream programs, particularly Job Network. Areas targeted for improvement included coverage by Job Network catchment areas; the establishment of Indigenous employment specialists; and requirements for job providers to include Indigenous service strategies.

The Commonwealth Grants Commission’s Report on Indigenous Funding 2001 /em> commented positively on the employment outcomes achieved under the Indigenous Employment Program – a ‘significant proportion of IEP assistance is being delivered to remote regions, and the employment outcomes being achieved under IEP seem to be good relative to outcomes for Indigenous people from mainstream assistance [60] f="#60">[60] However, it found that Job Network was not widely accepted in the Indigenous community, that it had varying levels of accessibility, especially in remote regions, and that poor employment outcomes continued despite a more equitable rate of commencements in Intensive Assistance (one of its employment services). Evaluation of Job Network Stage One indicated that Indigenous job seekers ‘were concerned about the quality and type of assistance [61]

Indigenous Business Australia (IBA) was recently established through the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Amendment Bill 2000 to expand the functions of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commercial Development Corporation (CDC). It seeks to: refocus business client expectations on commercial objectives; enable ATSIC to outsource its commercial services; encourage a shift in the culture surrounding Indigenous business support; and appoint a full-time chairperson to enable IBA to expand, particularly in its pursuit of joint venture arrangements.

The Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) Scheme is also central to the government’s approach. The CDEP Scheme has been in operation since 1977. It enables local Aboriginal organizations to provide employment and training as an alternative to unemployment benefits. CDEP participants forgo their rights to social security entitlements and receive wages from CDEP organisations at a similar level to benefits in return for part-time work. A CDEP grant to an organisation also provides on costs funds for the administration of projects and the purchase of materials, equipment and services. The CDEP Scheme operates in a diversity of contexts across Indigenous Australia, and provides a base for training, skills and enterprise development, as well as contributing to other economic, social and cultural outcomes in communities. The Scheme is led by the communities and participants involved, and any activity that benefits the community can be a CDEP activity. There are currently over 300 Indigenous community-based organisations and over 30,000 Indigenous people, about one-third of all Indigenous people in employment, participating in the CDEP Scheme. [62]

One of the advantages of the CDEP program is that it has evolved and adapted in response to the uniqueness of Indigenous labour force circumstances, and has significant social, economic and cultural benefits such as supporting traditional aspects of community life, and contributing to social cohesion and the viability of communities in remote areas.

The CDEP Scheme has a significant place in the history of struggle for Indigenous rights. The Scheme was initiated at Bamyili in the mid-70s as a negotiated alternative to ‘sit-down’ money in response to problems experienced by communities as a result of introducing cash incomes through the social security system. Although discriminatory references to Aboriginal people were removed from social security legislation in 1966, full access to social security benefits did not occur for Indigenous people until the late 1970s and in some remote communities, not until the early 1980s. The CDEP Scheme was thus a very progressive development in so far as it enabled Indigenous access to the social security system but sought to give some protection to economic, social and cultural rights by making adaptations to that system.

The CDEP Scheme has inevitably been compared with the Work for the Dole program. It has received renewed attention in light of current debates about Indigenous people and welfare passivity. Noel Pearson, for example, has commented on the CDEP Scheme as a moderately successful example of the application of the ‘reciprocity’ principle. [63]

The Scheme’s evolution as an adaptation to the employment circumstances and labour market realities of Indigenous Australians in the post-1967 ‘rights’ era has made it difficult to define. It has been variously described as an employment program, a form of income and a form of welfare benefits, a source of training or skilling, community development, a transition to employment in the mainstream labour market, a substitute provider of essential services, a source of community cohesion and cultural maintenance, an Indigenous initiative and even a form of self-determination.

While the CDEP Scheme has experienced continued popularity – there have always been more wanting to join the Scheme than can be accommodated – it has had its share of detractors as well as supporters. Issues of equity with the non-Indigenous workforce and possible discrimination on the basis of race have been major sources of contention.

In 1997, the federal Race Discrimination Commissioner released a report examining the Scheme, The CDEP and Racial Discrimination . The report found that while the CDEP Scheme is race-based in that it applies only to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, it is designed to deal with the disadvantage experienced by Indigenous communities in their access to social security and mainstream labour market programs and opportunities. Moreover, it seeks to do so in ways that enhance the economic, social and cultural rights of Indigenous peoples. As such it was seen as being adapted to the concrete circumstances of Indigenous communities, for example, in overcoming difficulties faced by those in remote locations, and therefore not discriminatory. The CDEP Scheme was also found not to be racially discriminatory in so far as it does not disadvantage non-Indigenous people.

The Report had some specific concerns, however, about the administration of the Scheme. Much of these related to the lack of consistency by Commonwealth agencies in the treatment of income derived from the CDEP Scheme. Serious inequities were caused by the definition of CDEP as a Commonwealth-funded program under the Social Security Act, which barred CDEP participants from becoming DSS customers and receiving the same services and allowances. The Scheme was also inconsistent in its treatment of pensioners. Following the findings of this Report and also those of ATSIC’s independent review of the CDEP Scheme, changes were introduced to address these inequities in the Further 1998 Budget Legislation Amendment (Social Security) Bill 1999 that came into effect in March 2000.

Further changes were announced in the 2001-02 Budget to align the CDEP scheme more closely with the Indigenous Employment Policy. $48 million, including new funding of $31 million, was allocated to CDEP organisations to take on the role of Indigenous Employment Centres and assist ‘up to 10,000 participants make the transition from CDEP work experience into paid employment’. This is to be achieved through the coordination of work experience, job search support and access to training to CDEP participants, and through support and mentoring assistance to Indigenous job seekers outside CDEP. [64] This funding is to commence in February 2002 and it is envisaged that it will apply in cities and regional centres where there are greater employment opportunities.

This new funding partly responds to concerns expressed by ATSIC that the expectations over recent years that CDEP schemes will give priority to the development of business enterprises and related employment, and also to expanding the number of participants who move into employment outside the Scheme, has placed greater pressure on CDEP without providing appropriate support. This is because these expectations require:

… greater liaison with the State, Territory and Commonwealth government Departments and agencies with employment, training and business support responsibilities. Some agencies, especially Centrelink, have contracted their service delivery to private contractors, with a reduction along the way of the previous capacity to deliver services in remote areas. Changes in status of CDEP participants between unemployment, CDEP employment, participation in training, and employment outside CDEP also have involved an enormous expansion of form-filling, liaison and detailed record keeping by CDEP administrators, on behalf of participants and the government agencies.

In summary, the demands on the CDEP administration staff in community organisations have become overwhelming, and nearly all of the projects have suffered at some time, particularly in the planning of work programs around community development objectives determined by participants, and in prompting staff turnover. [65]

ATSIC contrasts this pressure with the development over the past two years of the WFTD Scheme for unemployed people in the general community:

Although it draws on unemployed people in established urban areas where costs are much lower, the allowance for operating costs (“on costs”) of projects is, on average, 25% greater than is provided under the CDEP Scheme funding. This comparison confirms that the pressures on CDEP staff are the result of serious under-resourcing, particularly when the difficulties of operating in the remote and rural locations of most CDEPs are taken into account. It is the situation which Indigenous critics of government funding describe as “setting it up to fail”. [66]

Inequities still remain between the level of operational funding support provided for CDEP and that provided for the Work for the Dole program, despite a review by the Department of Finance and Administration and support from ATSIC and a Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet recommendation of a $300 per participant increase for training and work initiatives within CDEP. Such an increase in operational funding would ‘ensure appropriate supervision and the achievement of even greater training, employment and community development outcomes’ and without it, ‘CDEP organizations will continue to struggle to provide adequate supervision to CDEP workers and to ensure adherence to occupational health and safety standards’. [67]

The failure to provide additional operational funding to CDEPs means that, in the words of the ATSIC Chair, the Scheme ‘remains the poor cousin of the mainstream work for the dole program despite being the voluntary forerunner and setting the scene for the principles of mutual obligation and community participation’. [68]

For remote communities with fewer job opportunities, the 2001-02 Budget allocated $32 million from July 2001 for Community Participation Agreements. These are to be trialled in approximately 100 communities with arrangements whereby they design and negotiate their obligations and activities in return for income support, and plan for better delivery of services at the local level. The Agreements are to increase social capital by providing:

… a way [for income support recipients] to make a practical, positive contribution to their families and communities…. [to] give communities a way to involve everyone in community life, help them identify the services they need most and give them the support to access them…. [to] support activities such as leadership, strengthening culture and community governance. [69]

The initiative was developed in response to the McClure Report’s lack of extensive treatment of Indigenous welfare reform issues. Despite its exclusion from the interdepartmental process on welfare reform, ATSIC approached the government with a proposal for Community Participation Agreements in remote communities which formed the basis for this initiative. The modelling currently taking place with the Mutitjulu Community as a prototype for the implementation of the CPA initiative in remote communities will be discussed further in Chapter 3.

Mutual obligation, welfare reform and practical reconciliation – Indigenous-specific concerns

In addition to the general concerns raised above about the mutual obligation approach, there are a range of other concerns that relate to the specific circumstances of Indigenous people and to which attention must be devoted in any attempt to reform welfare or increase the economic participation of Indigenous people.

These concerns do not relate to the applicability of the mutual obligation approach per se to Indigenous people. As Social Justice Report 1999 observed:

The concept of mutual obligation is, of course, not alien to Indigenous peoples. Many Indigenous people argue that it is a concept that is fundamental to Indigenous social and cultural values. Indigenous people do not, for example, see themselves as “users” of land. They are related to and part of the land, with custodial obligations to nurture and protect it. [70]

Instead, the concerns relate to the extent to which the mutual obligation approach underpins current government policy approaches to Indigenous welfare reform and economic independence to the exclusion of initiatives to address the broader context of Indigenous marginalisation.

The combination of the rhetoric of mutual obligation, focused on self-reliance and responsibility, and practical reconciliation, emphasising practical and real outcomes in priority areas, is a powerful one. Both approaches share a number of common features.

Both mutual obligation and practical reconciliation see the main interaction in society as an individualised one, which is State-centred and focuses on the obligations of the individual to the State and vice versa. The coerciveness with which these obligations are imposed can act as a replacement bureaucratic and punitive form of control of Indigenous people and their engagement in the mainstream society.

Mutual obligation and practical reconciliation are also emotive at a very simplistic level, particularly in the language that is used to explain them. Mutual obligation, for example, uses populist rhetoric such as ‘pulling together’, ‘having a go’, and ‘a hand up not a handout’ [71] to focus attention on the perceived deficiencies of the individual. As UnitingCare explain:

For all the use of warm and fuzzy words like ‘participation’ and ‘inclusion’, a clear division is being drawn in society which depicts the ‘poor’ as less than fully human. Such a division is exacerbated by a redefinition of citizenship – which rests not on a series of rights and entitlements in an egalitarian state but, rather, upon the individual’s responsibility to make good her or his incapacities or failures. For all the use of warm and fuzzy words like ‘participation’ and ‘inclusion’, a clear division is being drawn in society which depicts the ‘poor’ as less than fully human. Such a division is exacerbated by a redefinition of citizenship – which rests not on a series of rights and entitlements in an egalitarian state but, rather, upon the individual’s responsibility to make good her or his incapacities or failures.

Mutual obligation encourages a picture of ‘irresponsible’ people failing to meet their duties to society despite the support and commitment shown to them. Practical reconciliation similarly creates a picture of the Government as concerned about achieving concrete outcomes in areas such as health and education, as opposed to addressing symbolic measures with the implication that the latter are irrelevant to improving the day to day livelihoods of Indigenous people. It seeks to discredit and close down debate about issues that do not fit within this framework, such as a formal apology or a treaty, even where they are perceived by Indigenous people to be of central importance to their advancement.

The language of mutual obligation and practical reconciliation is a significant concern when considered in the context of the adequacy of the overall commitment of government to addressing the socio-economic marginalisation of Indigenous people, which shall be discussed later in this section.

Both mutual obligation and practical reconciliation are also ahistorical. They are firmly grounded in the present circumstances of the individual and give little attention to the causal factors, or underlying issues as the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody described them, of Indigenous disadvantage. As stated in the introduction, they strip Indigenous disadvantage of its historical context and admit no contemporary, ongoing consequences. Consequently, nothing is seen to be particularly distinctive about Indigenous disadvantage or the necessary response to it.

The context of Indigenous marginalisation

Current Indigenous employment and welfare policy responds to the situation of Indigenous people by striving for equality of participation in the formal economy and through increasing ‘self-reliance’ through greater economic participation. Promoting such participation is quite obviously necessary and measures to facilitate this in a culturally appropriate manner (be it through the specific focus of mainstream programs and agencies on greater accessibility or through specifically targeted measures) are to be welcomed.

But such an approach is limited. It does not acknowledge the broader fabric of social and economic factors that contribute to the level of Indigenous disadvantage and economic marginalisation such as dispossession, systemic racism, [73] structural inequality and social marginalisation.

Colonising processes have left a range of effects on Indigenous populations that are inter-related and continue to contribute to the current context of Indigenous disadvantage. [74] These include intergenerational poverty, welfare dependency, over-representation in the justice system, substance abuse, family and societal disintegration, spiritual and cultural dislocation, and environmental damage. The level of control exercised by the State over many aspects of the lives of Indigenous people has been central to the creation of this context of disadvantage.

In addition, other factors – historical, demographic, geographic and cultural – make improvements to Indigenous employability and economic participation difficult to facilitate. These factors include poor health, low educational levels of Indigenous people (which is of increasing concern with the rapid technological change in the labour market), over-crowding of living conditions and low self-esteem.

Urging self-reliance for many Indigenous people in this context, without acknowledging or adequately addressing these underlying factors, is fanciful. When combined with punitive, coercive measures it is potentially vindictive. It is highly probable that it will also result in the opposite of the intended effect – rather than inspiring people to raise themselves out of a position of extreme marginalisation, it can in fact further demoralise them especially if support is inadequate.

These factors are compounded in regional and remote areas for reasons often relating to ‘locational disadvantage’, [75] [75] such as the lack of business development and employment opportunities, but also the embeddedness of government service provision and activity in community organizations; embeddedness of individuals in wider social networks not contingent on economic participation; and divisions within communities for historical, cultural or political r [76] [76] Poor resource endowments and market linkage associated with ‘remoteness’ are also reasons for underdevelopment, with the development opportunities provided by major mineral deposits and the opportunities for tourist and cultural industries being exceptions in som [77] The requirement to undertake certain mutual obligation activities can also be problematic, due to distances to be travelled, and lack of appropriate work activities.

As a consequence, the mutual obligation approach over-stretches itself in its application to Indigenous welfare reform by assuming that ‘the intensity and scale of ... personal and social problems, wrongly attributed to welfare dependency, can be addressed through mechanisms which both enable, and ultimately compel, individuals to engage with the formal economy’. [78]

The experience of the CDEP Scheme to date suggests that this is unlikely, with the Scheme predominating in areas where economic opportunities are most limited rather than providing a lever for economic transformation. [79] Notably, however, the recent report of the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs on the situation of urban-dwelling Aborigines urges greater funding for CDEP placements in urban areas on the basis that CDEP is able to provide greater opportunities for advancement, work training and employment than mainstream programs. [80]

Accordingly, ‘welfare reform must be accompanied by labour market reform in mainstream Australia and [that is] why significant progress for indigenous Australians will not be achieved without sweeping economic reform’. [81]

A comparison of the current approach to the findings and recommendations of the 1985 Report of the Committee of Review of Aboriginal Employment and Training Programs (the Miller Report) [82] indicates the extent to which a more holistic approach to Indigenous employment and welfare reform has been eroded in the past 15 years.

The Miller Report undertook to assess the effectiveness of the 1977 National Employment Strategy for Aboriginals (NESA) in addressing employment equity between Indigenous and non-Indigenous populations. The Report concluded that ‘the Strategy can be said to have had only marginal impact on the overall Aboriginal employment situation’, with levels of Indigenous unemployment and economic dependence remaining high, and that the causes for this lay in ‘the social and structural problems faced by Aboriginal people in providing for their livelihood’. [83]

It also emphasised that adequate treatment of these issues was beyond the scope of an Indigenous employment and training strategy, as they concerned ‘access to and control of land and other resources, local government arrangements for Aboriginal towns, relationships with other forms of local government, access to development capital and involvement in particular industries’. [84] The Report urges:

… the government to adopt a policy of support to Aboriginal people which goes beyond the welfare, housing and municipal services industries and which should be directed towards Aboriginal people becoming more independent by enabling them to provide for their own livelihood. Programs to achieve this will be longer-term, involve real training and result in Aboriginal control of resources, as well as access to jobs in the regular labour market. [85]

By contrast, the current policy approach to welfare reform runs the risk of collapsing the complex issues surrounding Indigenous disadvantage into the category of ‘welfare dependency’ and of keeping the focus firmly on the individual recipient rather than the broader aspirations of Indigenous peoples. As I noted above, the language of mutual obligation, and to a lesser extent practical reconciliation, is a blaming language which sets up assumptions about the individual recipient.

This absolves the various levels of government from their responsibility to facilitate the circumstances for greater Indigenous participation, such as genuine economic reform, and in some instances to provide basic citizenship entitlements such as functional municipal services and infrastructure for communities.

The CDEP Scheme, for example, has a history of supplying essential services to some communities (such as health services, child-care services, housing and infrastructure construction, garbage collection, community maintenance), sometimes becoming the entry point for government, especially in remote areas. Indeed, ‘in remote communities, CDEP is often the only institution; it represents governance. As the Spicer review said, ‘Without it, some remote communities would simply not exist’. [86] The CDEP fills gaps in government service delivery by providing specific employment, training and community development initiatives for Indigenous people.

The focus of mutual obligation on the individual’s responsibilities also shifts the focus away from the adequacy of the measures adopted by government to address the broader context of Indigenous marginalisation.

To date each of the Social Justice Reports have emphasised the importance of ensuring governmental accountability for the outcomes of service delivery to Indigenous people. As last year’s report noted, we must ask whether enough is being done to overcome the level of inequality faced by Indigenous people (that is, to close the gap) or whether we are merely doing enough to manage the inequality.

Assessing the impact of different forms of ‘social cost’ can play a significant role in developing a human rights approach to disadvantage. If the costs incurred by government attempts to address social problems (for example, through remedial programs) do not make significant inroads into the economic marginalisation of Indigenous people, then a government can be said to be merely managing the ‘cost of the status quo’ and the costs associated with the latter are likely to escalate. A long-term commitment to restructuring the relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people through the provision of adequate resources would not only have better prospects for changing the circumstances of Indigenous people but may also ‘lead to the progressive reduction and eventual elimination of the social costs accrued to Indigenous disadvantage’. Assessing the impact of different forms of ‘social cost’ can play a significant role in developing a human rights approach to disadvantage. If the costs incurred by government attempts to address social problems (for example, through remedial programs) do not make significant inroads into the economic marginalisation of Indigenous people, then a government can be said to be merely managing the ‘cost of the status quo’ and the costs associated with the latter are likely to escalate. A long-term commitment to restructuring the relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people through the provision of adequate resources would not only have better prospects for changing the circumstances of Indigenous people but may also ‘lead to the progressive reduction and eventual elimination of the social costs accrued to Indigenous disadvantage’. [87]

CAEPR has made estimates concerning the social cost of achieving parity between Indigenous and other Australians in the workforce. These indicate that if Indigenous unemployment was made commensurate with that of the rest of the population, there would be major savings to government in payments to the unemployed, increases to tax revenue and national production, as well as improvements in areas such as Indigenous health. [88] They warn that if significant action is not taken soon to address Indigenous employment status, the current situation is likely to deteriorate further due to the relatively high Indigenous population growth and the ‘difficulties of economic catch-up in a rapidly changing and increasingly skills-based labour market [89]

A relevant example of managing rather than overcoming Indigenous disadvantage is the continuing over-reliance on the CDEP Scheme. At various times, the CDEP Scheme has been criticised on the grounds that it runs the risk of becoming a ‘life-time destination’ for the Indigenous unemployed rather than a ‘conduit to other employment options’ [90] f="#90">[90] and that it is ‘a second-rate labour market created by government that traps people into low-paid and part-time work and protects them from the rigours of the rea [91] These considerations have no doubt motivated the government into introducing, through the Indigenous Employment Strategy, bonuses for moving people off CDEP into paid employment.

The CDEP Scheme’s lack of a prescribed time-frame and long-term employment goals implies that it exists to support a problem perceived as intractable or maybe just not worthy of significant commitment to redress. However, recent estimates indicate that the younger age structure of the Indigenous population may lead to greater employment need as the Indigenous population aged 15 years and over is expected to grow at 2 % per annum over the decade from 1996, compared to 1 % for the rest of the population. As a consequence it has been estimated that in the first decade of twenty-first century, the costs to government of low income disparity are estimated to grow significantly and ‘maintenance of employment levels at current unacceptably low levels will remain dependent on continued expansion of the CDEP Scheme’. [92]

These factors indicate that government expenditure on Indigenous employment is still relatively low in comparison to need. They also draw attention to the inadequacy of the CDEP Scheme as a special measure in the face of levels of Indigenous employment need and inequality that continue to escalate. Funding shortfalls for health, housing and infrastructure against estimates of Indigenous need further compounds this situation. These are areas that impact on the well-being and employability of Indigenous people, a point emphasised by the recent Health is life report. [93]

A further concern is that the language of the mutual obligation approach can potentially promote intolerance among the wider society. In the case of Indigenous policy, such intolerance also exists on a broader scale with common myths about Indigenous people receiving special benefits through the level of government expenditure on Indigenous disadvantage. The rhetoric of mutual obligation can effectively operate to transfer community dissatisfaction at the level of outcomes achieved by government to the Indigenous population itself. This is a highly undesirable outcome, which can undermine broader community support for reconciliation, among other things.

The ‘practical’ focus on addressing welfare dependency through mutual obligation means that a range of inter-related factors – social, cultural, political and historical – integral to reversing Indigenous marginalisation are being consistently obscured from the social policy lens.

Mutual obligation and Indigenous cultural values

The mutual obligation approach is often said to be appropriate for countering Indigenous welfare dependency on the basis that it is consistent with Indigenous cultural values such as reciprocity and an emphasis on community.

Noel Pearson has made the following comments about the effects of ‘welfare poison’ since 1967:

The irony of our newly won citizenship in 1967 was that after we became citizens with equal rights and the theoretical right to equal pay, we lost the meagre foothold that we had in the real economy and we became almost comprehensively dependent upon passive welfare for our livelihood… we find thirty years later that life in the safety net for three decades and two generations has produced a social disaster. [94]

A consequence of this dependency on welfare has been that ‘the responsibilities of individual citizens toward other citizens and their responsibility to contribute to the common good’ [95] [95] has been eroded in Aboriginal societies. Pearson advocates mechanisms for reinstituting traditional values of ‘reciprocity’ in order to address the social breakdown and community dysfunction on the Cape York Peninsula on the basis that ‘you need both rights and responsibilities to develop and participate in a suc [96] He has also argued for the need for Indigenous communities to re-discover a sense of obligation or responsibility to other community members in the wake of a ‘rights-based’ welfare regime that has given way to passivity and a sense of entitlement.

Pearson recently described the effects of passive welfare on Aboriginal society as follows in the Perkins Memorial Oration:

Passive welfare has come to be the dominant influence on relationships, values and attitudes of our society in Cape York Peninsula. Indeed we are now at a stage where many of the traditions we purport to follow are too often merely self-deceptions (that we care for each other, that we respect our Elders, that we value our culture and traditions) and the ‘traditions’ which we do follow are in fact distortions conditioned by the pathological social situation which passive welfare has reduced us to: we sit around in a drinking circle because we are Aboriginal. [97]

While Pearson advocates that Indigenous people need to exercise responsibility for their own self-determination, he also emphasises the responsibility of government:

Many people will take what I’m saying about the poison of passive welfare as a justification for their argument that the government should not be providing ear marked resources to Aboriginal people, but I do not support those ideas. It is the government’s responsibility to coordinate and facilitate the solution of an urgent social crisis. It has the responsibility to facilitate our return to the real economy. However the government can only facilitate a solution, it cannot solve the problem. It also follows from what I have said that the government’s responsibility is only transitory, or at least not indefinite. [98]

Pearson’s approach includes support for a substantial investment by government to the development of a regional interface between Indigenous organisations and communities on the Cape, and government departments and agencies and other stakeholders. Modelling based on this approach was outlined in Chapter 4 of last year’s Social Justice Report .

Joseph Elu, the Chairman of Indigenous Business Australia, made a similar call in his Menzies lecture series speech in March 2001 for ‘governments to stop sheltering communities and wrapping them up in cotton wool for “their own good”’, and to move beyond subsidising Indigenous disadvantage with welfare payments. It is time, he stated, to ‘open up debate about what is working and empower our communities to make choices about what is an appropriate program for our peoples’ [99] [99] with both government and the private sector. He pointed to the need to advance economic development by providing ‘access to capital, on proper and equitable terms’ to Indigenous communities, and to create an environment that encourages private sector involvement. He further suggested that governments and the private sector consider initiatives for establishing an economic base for Indigenous Australians such as: industry incentives; taxation incentives; creation of economic development zones; legislation for requirement of Indigenous involvement in the expenditure of government contracts; and compulsory community services for Aus [100]

Pearson’s approach has received wide support and been cited as an exemplary model of mutual obligation by both sides of politics. [101] It has also played an integral role in the establishment of the Cape York Partnership plan between Indigenous communities of the Cape and the Queensland Governm [102]

Pearson’s comments have, however, to a large extent been appropriated by the government and policy makers and have been used to justify an approach to Indigenous policy making that is not based on the recognition of Indigenous rights. Indeed, his approach to reciprocity is regularly cited as support for the argument that rights in general are not ‘practical’ and do not contribute to improving the livelihoods of Indigenous peoples. For example, in an article in the Age published in July of this year, the federal Minister for Reconciliation and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs claimed that:

More Australians should listen to Cape York Aboriginal leader Noel Pearson… He has said that the organisations representing indigenous people have become so caught up in a rights agenda that they have forgotten the importance of taking responsibility for their own issues. [103]

However, Pearson’s argument is that: ‘The substantial agreement has to be that the country is going to respect the rights of Aborigines to autonomy and self-determination and, in turn, it means that Aboriginal; people will accept that they need to take responsibility for their own self-determination’. [104] 4">[104] He has recently stated that both sides of Australian politics ‘continue to be half right in the policies that they are prepared to advocate’, and that the ‘Coalition will better understand the problems of responsibility but will be antipathetic and wrong in relation to the rights of Aboriginal people: they advocate further diminution of the native title property rights of A [105] 46;.[105] As Patrick Dodson has explained, ‘The Government wishes to drive a wedge between the concept of rights and welfare but also between those who advocate a rights agenda and those who seek relie [106]

The misrepresentation of Pearson’s insights by political commentators to suggest that the attainment of equal rights has led to welfare dependency and a social disaster in communities presents a false picture of efforts since 1967. It implies that first, a rights culture was fully implemented and second, it consequently failed and accordingly it should be abandoned.

Such a suggestion ignores the fact that the institution of equal rights at the formal level was 170 years late. The exclusion of Indigenous people from mainstream services was broader than an exclusion from welfare – it was also an exclusion from any form of participation in the formal economy or society through lack of access to education, health, housing and infrastructure of a comparable quality to that available to the rest of society.

There are a number of consequences of this history of exclusion. Fundamentally, removing barriers to access does not address the deeply entrenched marginalisation that has resulted. Many Indigenous people were left without the skills necessary to participate on an equal footing in the employment market. Low levels of education and a life experience that does not include employment has also had legacies for subsequent generations.

What this situation requires is the commitment to processes, accompanied by adequate resources, which allow Indigenous people to catch up rather than to seek to compete on the basis of what is clearly not a level playing field. There remains a lack of adequate commitment to this purpose.

In this context, a situation of welfare dependency is ‘an inescapable conclusion… (and) is part of the historical legacy of the dispossession of Aboriginal people and their continuing exclusion from economic power structures rather than the making of Aboriginal people themselves’. [107] 7">[107] As ATSIC have noted, access to welfare has ‘unintentionally, and perhaps paradoxically, created poverty traps from which it is h [108]

The Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research has also argued that the rapidity with which Indigenous people have moved from a situation of exclusion from the mainstream economy to dependency on welfare by the beginning of the 1990s has been a major shift. [109] Clearly it is time to move beyond this. It requires acknowledgement, however, of the structural barriers of the past that remain of contemporary relevance.

What has fundamentally been lacking before and since 1967 is a rights culture that respects Indigenous people and provides them with the opportunity to participate on an equal footing in Australian society. The refusal to tolerate the discriminatory practices of exclusion from welfare, education and participation in the mainstream society and economy any longer was merely the first step on the road to a culture of rights and respect for Indigenous people. It is disingenuous to suggest otherwise. Pearson’s call for greater reciprocity and community responsibility is also not an either/or suggestion. It is completely consistent with a rights framework, and indeed, as the rights framework for reconciliation set out in Social Justice Report 2000 demonstrates, it is an integral component.

The equation of the Pearson approach with the government’s mutual obligation and practical reconciliation agenda also applies to the concepts of reciprocity and community. Significant differences exist between Pearson’s representation of these values and those which actually apply in an Indigenous cultural setting, specifically with regard to whom reciprocity is owed and to which community.

In his discussion of ‘reciprocity’ as it features in Pearson’s proposals for Aboriginal welfare reform, David Martin distinguishes between reciprocity as a principle of social obligation in Indigenous communities and mutual obligation as articulating a particular relationship between the State and the individual. Reciprocity in this sense applies ‘between the individual and his or her particular community, family and local group’, whereas mutual obligation applies ‘essentially between the individual, as an autonomous actor, and the state, representing an undifferentiated “community”’. In his discussion of ‘reciprocity’ as it features in Pearson’s proposals for Aboriginal welfare reform, David Martin distinguishes between reciprocity as a principle of social obligation in Indigenous communities and mutual obligation as articulating a particular relationship between the State and the individual. Reciprocity in this sense applies ‘between the individual and his or her particular community, family and local group’, whereas mutual obligation applies ‘essentially between the individual, as an autonomous actor, and the state, representing an undifferentiated “community”’.

The goal of the latter is to ensure that ‘people … take their place as individuals in an increasingly mobile workforce within a globalised order’ [111] 1">[111] through participation in the formal economy. This means that Indigenous participation in traditional and cultural forms of reciprocity is not necessarily easily factored into the mutual obligati [112] However, the CDEP Scheme has operated to support aspects of the more traditional lifestyles of some communities and the Community Participation Agreements are to recognise certain social and cultural forms of participation. But as David Martin has observed:

…the obligations accorded significance by Indigenous people are typically not to the wider, largely non-Indigenous society, from which after all they have historically been excluded or at best marginalised: on the contrary, their obligations lie within Indigenous society itself, for example to specific kin or within ‘family’ networks. [113]

Forms of non-economic participation often fulfil certain obligations and contribute to ‘community’ life:

For example, not having any employment in the Australian labour market may actually empower many traditional Indigenous peoples to hunt, fish, paint, and live on the country. Indeed, the extra hours of ‘spare’ time may facilitate more extensive participation in ceremonial activities, thus increasing what may be loosely defined, in the Indigenous context, as ‘social capital’. [114]

In addition, many Indigenous Australians are:

already meeting their obligation to community by participating in community building, cultural maintenance and family support activities, including: volunteer roles in community organizations; the CDEP scheme; income distribution among family members; caring for sick and elderly people – rather than placement in nursing homes; and reinforcing tradition and culture. [115]

In her research on communities at Yuendumu in Central Australia and Kuranda in North Queensland, CAEPR researcher Diane Smith found that:

Family members fall back upon culturally-based values, their own system of shared child care, and networks of economic support and demand sharing. This Indigenous system of support is a form of risk-pooling that keeps many families financially afloat. It constitutes precisely the kind of ‘social participation’ and ‘social capital’ identified by the McClure Report as the very base of strong families and communities. [116]

However, this kind of ‘social participation’ and ‘social capital’ may fall short of public policy agendas to stimulate labour market participation. Certain social support activities may be seen as comparable, or even more important or predictable than such participation: ‘Attractive salaries, travel and accommodation or guarantees of special support and promotion opportunities may not compensate for the loss of social support many Indigenous people feel when entering a mainstream labour market program’. [117]

There has been an increasing emphasis on community capacity building and social obligations in mutual obligation policy development since the McClure Report. However, as the above discussion indicates, the term ‘community’ carries some complex connotations in the policy Indigenous context:

the ‘community’ … is not just an aggregation of individuals, as the non-Indigenous welfare policies would have it. Nor is it an undifferentiated ‘community’. Rather, reflecting basic Indigenous structures, it should be seen as being comprised of ‘family’ or other relevant sub-groupings. the ‘community’ … is not just an aggregation of individuals, as the non-Indigenous welfare policies would have it. Nor is it an undifferentiated ‘community’. Rather, reflecting basic Indigenous structures, it should be seen as being comprised of ‘family’ or other relevant sub-groupings.

The construction of ‘community’ as a focus of Indigenous policy since the mid-1970s in the post-assimilation Whitlam era has imposed some additional limitations. This approach has established an array of Aboriginal community organizations as ‘gate-keepers’ and ‘avenues of self-determination’ at the local level:

… enabl[ing] the government to distribute funds for welfare programs and the delivery of services to Aboriginal people. It was seen as the medium which would automatically be culturally appropriate, democratic, and at the same politically and socially acceptable to the majority of Australians. [119]

However, many of these ‘communities’ are based in former colonialist institutions and practices of missions, reserves and pastoral stations and the dispossession and relocation of Indigenous populations. These constructions of Indigenous communities have in fact contributed over time to the erosion of Indigenous social, cultural and economic rights and the development of intergenerational poverty and welfare passivity. [120] 120] This is reflected in the term ‘mission mentality’ which was coined by Aboriginal activists in the 1980s to describe ‘the “dependency” upon the government handout system that Aboriginal people ha [121] ’. [121] The continued use of these culturally inappropriate classifications of ‘community’ has the potential to contribute to the assimilation process, as it embeds the loss of Indigenous wellbeing and social cohesion by undermining traditional authority structures and kinship responsibilities, on occasion exacerbating pre-existing ine [122]

Care must be taken that the application of whatever public policy prescriptions may be in vogue, especially without adequate consultation and negotiation with Indigenous people, does not have the potential to inflict further damage as the following observations on the use of the term ‘social capital’ in Indigenous policy indicate:

Social capital is an important notion which helps open up a vision of Australian society in which Indigenous people actively participate. Yet any vision of what an ‘ideal’ society might look like in the future is usually constructed by theorists with little or no dialogue and negotiation with Indigenous Australians … The reality is a social and political vision which can inadvertently perpetuate the marginalisation of Indigenous Australians unless they assimilate on white terms. [123]

While Indigenous people in urban and rural centres are often supported by mainstream services, those living in more remote areas often depend ‘almost totally on the coordinated processes of several different government jurisdictions, underpinned by financial support from the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC)’. [124] 124] It is necessary to find ‘the appropriate type of social and infrastructure program to suit people whose distinct culture alienates them from the demands of some institutions in which they are [125] In discussing remote settlements, HREOC’s Review of the 1994 Water Report observes that the challenge is to reconcile current service delivery issues for remote Indigenous communities with ‘the rights that members of those communities may seek to exercise’, particularly ‘the principle of non-discrimination; the principle of distinct status; and group as distinct from individuals’. It states:

These factors are more closely linked with recognition and respect for another culture rather than providing access to conventional market opportunities. The challenge is to meet distinct group needs (households and communities) on Indigenous land, through delivery mechanisms which are cost-effective, demand driven and sustainable. [126]

Conclusions – Indigenous empowerment and effective participation

This chapter has raised a number of concerns about the application of the combination of practical reconciliation and mutual obligation to Indigenous people. Ultimately, these concerns relate to this approach’s narrow definition of the relationship between Indigenous people and the mainstream society, and the punitive way that it seeks to impose the relationship through harsh penalties.

To date this approach has failed to transform the relationship between Indigenous people and the mainstream society so that it is conducted on a basis of greater equality and in a manner that is freely determined by Indigenous people.

As a consequence, while it strives for empowerment at an individual level, mutual obligation does so from a position in which the government is not prepared to relinquish the power and control that it holds. The unwillingness to change the existing power dynamic ultimately constrains the relevance of the mutual obligation approach to achieving lasting and sustainable change.

Changes to this power dynamic, through the effective participation of Indigenous people in decisions that affect them, are essential. On the eve of the 2001-02 budget ATSIC released a document which sought to examine the policy approaches that underpin Indigenous policy formulation. The central contention of ATSIC was that for all programs and policy proposals, the ‘values and aspirations that are meaningful to, and express priorities of, Australia’s Indigenous peoples must be the basis for the policy approaches being taken’. [127]

Accordingly, the question that should be answered in relation to each proposed initiative is, simply ‘Will this activity enhance Indigenous people’s capacity to achieve what is important to them and, in its development and implementation, contribute to the empowerment of Indigenous peoples and the achievement of their objectives and priorities?’ [128]

It is difficult to see that mutual obligation fulfils this criterion in its present form, particularly given that it is about the responsibilities and duties of the individual Indigenous citizen rather than about the obligation of the State, within an historical framework, to ensure that:

… ‘mainstream’ programs and service providers… adapt their program policies and administrative requirements and practices to accommodate the legitimate values, beliefs and lifestyles of their Indigenous clients. [129]

Its terms of reference are simply too narrowly focused to fully appreciate and take account of the broader context of the everyday lives of Indigenous people. Any proposed levers for ‘breaking the welfare cycle’ should be evaluated to see whether they generate long-term, targeted outcomes or merely offer yet another round of potentially self-defeating quick fixes. Serious application, including consideration of the use of special measures, needs to be made to the question of how an adequate investment can be made to build both financial and human capacity to address Indigenous employment need, particularly in the futures of our young people. Any commitment to overcoming disadvantage should also involve a full democratic partnership with Indigenous people, ‘[e]nsuring that [Indigenous] individuals and communities are adequately involved in decisions that affect their well being, including the design and delivery of programs’. [130] It should also provide support for Indigenous autonomy in terms that recognise and respect cultural difference and the right to self-determination, particularly in the form of strategies for capacity-building and increasing self-governance.

These issues are explored in greater detail in the next chapter of this report. In particular, it examines the necessity for devolving power to the community level, through development and support for building the capacity of Indigenous communities to determine their own destiny and take control of their lives. Within this context, a mutual obligation approach can be more meaningful in the longer term.

1 Newman, The Hon J, ‘The future of welfare in the 21st century’, Speech, National Press Club, Canberra, 29 September 1999, p1.

2 See Kinnear, P, ‘Mutual obligation: Ethical and social implications’ (August 2000) Discussion Paper Number 32, the Australia Institute, Canberra, pp10-22, for a detailed discussion of the origins of a social contract in seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophy.

3 ibid , p14.

4 ibid , p11.

5 Scanlon, C, ‘The network of moral sentiments: The third way and community’ (2000) 15 Arena journal 59, pp57-79.

6 Parliament of Australia Parliamentary Library, ‘Current issues: Social Policy Group: Welfare review’, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 2000, p6.

7 ibid , p2.

8 McClure, P, (Chair), Participation Support for a more equitable society: Final report of the reference group on welfare reform , Department of Family and Community Services, Canberra, July 2000, p6.

9 ibid .

Government response to the final report – Ministerial statement 10 Newman, the Hon J, ‘Welfare reform encourages people to reach potential Media release, se, 14 December ߐ Department of Family and Community Se Government response to the final report – Ministerial statement at www.facs.gov.au/internet/facsinternet.nsf/whatsnew/welfare_reform_background.htm ound.htm (11 December 2001). See ACOSS, ‘Still a long road ahead for fair welfare reform
Impact , p6, for some discussion of the Government’s response to McClure.

11 ACOSS, ibid.

12 See ACOSS, ‘Benchmarks for fair welfare reform: Adequate incomes, real opportunities and fair obligations’ ACOSS I www.acoss.org.au/info/2001/303.htm (May 21 2001).

13 See Kinnear, P, op.cit, for further discussion of a social justice basis for mutual obligation within contract theory. For some critique of the current mutual obligation approach see also Yeatman, A, ‘Mutual Obligation: What kind of contract is this?’, in Shaver, S, and Saunders, P, Social policy for the 21st century: Justice and responsibility , Vol.1, SPRC, NSW, Sydney, 1999, pp255-68 and Raper, M, ‘Examining the assumptions behind the welfare review’, in Saunders, P, (ed), Reforming the Australian welfare state, Australian Institute of Family Studies – Commonwealth of Australia, Melbourne, 2000, pp250-70.

14 Rawls, J, A theory of justice , Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1973, pp111-12, quoted in Kinnear, P, ibid, p15.

15 Saunders, P, ‘The changing social security policy context: Implications for the CDEP program’, in Morphy, F, and Sanders, W, The Indigenous welfare economy and the CDEP Scheme , CAEPR Research Monograph No.20, CAEPR, Canberra, 2000, p24.

16 Yeatman, A, op.cit , p264.

17 ACOSS, ‘Breaching the safety net: The harsh impact of social security penalties’ ACOSS I www.acoss.org.au/info/2001/305x.htm (14 December 2001) p7.

18 ibid , p10.

19 ibid , p3.

20 ibid , p5.

21 ibid, p2.

22 ibid . See also ACOSS, ‘Call for suspension of third breach penalties of 8 weeks no payment’ media release , 13 August 2001.

23 Sanders, W, Unemployment payments, the Activity Test and Indigenous Australians: Understanding breach rates, research monograph no. 15/1999, CAEPR, Canberra, 1999, pix.

24 ibid, p114.

25 Moses, J, and Sharpels, I, ‘Breaching – History, trends and issues’, Paper 7th National Congress on Unemployment, Sydney, 30 November – 1 December 2000, cited in ACOSS, ‘Breaching op.cit , p22.

26 Kinnear provides a useful table outlining the range of possibilities, from ‘willing but unable due to lack of jobs’ through to ‘unwilling to work despite availability of jobs and absence of any inhibitor’, noting in regard to the former option that ‘[c]urrent policy side-steps this issue op.cit , p18.

27 McClure, P, op.cit , p5.

28 ibid , p56.

29 ibid , pp6, 46.

30 ATSIC, ‘Social Welfare Reform: ATSIC submission’, CDEP and Employment Policy Branch, Canberra, January 2000, p15.

31 McClure, P, op.cit , p41.

32 ibid, p46.

33 Howard, The Hon J, ‘Transcript of the Prime Minister the Hon John Howard MP - Melbourne Press Club address’, Speech, 22 November 2000, p1.

34 Yeatman, A, op.cit , p256.

35 Martin, D, ‘Community development in the context of welfare dependence’, in Morphy, F, and Sand op.cit , p33.

36 McClure, P, op.cit , p10, 12. McClure’s model does however draw on social partnerships with other stakeholders, the implications of which are discussed below.

37 The McClure Report factors emphases on assessment of individual circumstance and the need for the broader community to exercise obligations to the unemployed, particularly through capacity-building and partnerships, into its proposals for a Participation Support System. See discussion below.

38 Kinnear notes that one response from the welfare sector to the Government’s application of mutual obligation policy has been that ‘it is unacceptable to compel unemployed people to undertake activities that cannot be demonstrated to enhance their long-term position’. op.cit , p7.

39 ACOSS, ‘Does Work for the Dole lead to work for wages? ACOSS analysis’ (November 2000) ACOSS I www.acoss.org.au/info/2000/info223.htm (23 December 2001), p1.

40 Kinnear, P, op.cit , p7. The independent study was Sawer, H, ‘One fundamental social value: Participants’ views on Work for the Dole’, RMIT, Melbourne, 2000.

41 ACOSS, ‘Does Work for the Dole lead to work for wage op.cit , p1. ACOSS’s analysis was based on data from DEWRSB, ‘Work for the Dole net impact study’, August 2000, and DEWRSB, ‘Labour market assistance outcomes’, June quarter 2000 (September 2000).

42 ibid .

43 ibid.

44 See discussion in Yeatman, op.cit, pp 258-9. Following Budget 2001, mutual obligation requirements for parenting payment recipients were introduced and are to be implemented over a two-year period. Mature Age and Partner Allowees are to be encouraged to transfer to Newstart, and from July 2003 there will be no further grants of these Allowances. Requirements to undertake an approved activity or WFTD have been extended to 39 year olds, and those between 40 and 49 will be required to complete specific amounts of study, part-time or community work or a mutual obligation activity.

45 Kinnear, P, op.cit , p19. The tendency of ‘breaching’ to penalise disadvantaged sections of the population, such as Indigenous people and youth, is an example of the discriminatory effects of this policy emphasis.

46 Peter Saunders notes the findings of a survey conducted in 2000 on community attitudes to social change and social policy indicated that: ‘While a large majority favoured requiring the young employed and, to a lesser degree, the long-term unemployed, to do just about anything as a condition of getting benefit … [t]here was much greater reluctance to impose activity test requirements on the older unemployed and those with young children, and strong opposition when it comes to people affected by a disability.’ S op.cit , p3.

47 Fincher, R, and Saunders, P, ‘The complex contexts of Australian inequality’, in Fincher, R, and Saunders, P, (eds), Creating unequal futures: Rethinking poverty, inequality and disadvantage, Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest, NSW, p33.

48 Travers, P, ‘Inequality and the futures of our children’, in Fincher, R, and Saund op.cit , p121.

49 Kinnear, P, op.cit, p34.

50 Leveratt, M. The Other Centenary: One Hundred Years of Poverty Lines and Inequality , Uniting Care Victoria, June 2001, p8.

51 ibid.

52 See also Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social Justice Report 1999, HREOC, Sydney, 2000, pp2- Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social Justice Report 2000 , HREOC, Sydney, 2000, Chapter 2.

53 Ruddock, the Hon P, ‘Our path togethe media release, 22 May 2001.

54 Herron, the Hon J, ‘Removing the welfare shackles media release , 18 March ߎ ‘Removing the welfare shackles: A discussion paper on a reform initiative for Indigenous economic development’

55 For discussion, see ATSIC, ‘Welfare reform: a brief history’ (Autumn 2001) ATSIC News, p5, and Altman, J, ‘”Mutual obligation”, the CDEP scheme, and development: Prospects in remote Australia’, in Morphy, F, op.cit , pp125-34.

56 Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Labour force characteristics of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians: Occasional paper’, (2000) ABS Canberra. In February 2000, the Indigenous unemployment rate was 17.6% compared to 7.3% for non-Indigenous people. This does not include those people who are not actively seeking employment or people on CDEP.

57 McClure, P, op.cit , p38.

58 ibid , p48.

59 Altman, J, op.cit , pp128-30.

60 Commonwealth Grants Commission, Report on Indigenous Funding 2001 , Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2001, p254.

61 ibid.

62 For an overview of the issues surrounding CDEP, see Race Discrimination Commissioner, The CDEP Scheme and racial discrimination: A report by the Race Discrimination Commissioner , Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1997, pp1- Morphy, F, and Sanders, W, op.cit; and Spicer, I, Independent review of the Community Development Projects (CDEP) Scheme, Office of Public Affairs, ATSIC, Canberra, 1997.

63 Although he makes the further provison that CDEP be ‘fixed up’ by ‘reinsert[ing] the original goals of reciprocity and responsibility into this resource Our right to take responsibility – discussion paper, Cape York Land Council, Cape York Peninsula, June 1999, p67.

64 Vanstone, the Hon A, and Abbott, the Hon T, ‘Our path together: Support for CDEP Participants to get a job Australians working together – Helping people to move forward, Fact Sheet 6 , Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2001, p1. Other funding was allocated to improve Indigenous access to mainstream services, such as through additional funding of $9 million to improve Centrelink’s remove area servicing strategy; $10 million for increased education and training assistance; as well as $32 million for improved assessment for Indigenous and eligible job seekers; and access to Training Credits of up to $800 per participant in Job Search Training and Intensive Assistance.

65 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Directions for change – Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 2001/02 Budget outlook , ATSIC, Canberra, 2001, pp8-9.

66 ibid.

67 Whitby, T, (Commissioner), ‘Changes to CDEP’, ATSIC – Budget media release , 22 May 2001, p1.

68 Clark, G, (Chair), ‘2001 Budget – A mixed media release , 22 May 2001.

69 Vanstone, the Hon A, and Abbott, the Hon T, ‘A fair deal for Indigenous Australians Australians working together – Helping people to move forward, Fact Sheet 2 , pp1,2.

70 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social Justice Report 1999, op.ci t, p3.

71 See further: Howard, the Hon J, op.cit , and ‘Transcript of the Prime Minister the Hon John Howard MP, Menzies Lecture Series, Perspectives on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Issue Speech , 13 December 2000.

72 Leveratt, M, op.cit , p7.

73 ABS and CAEPR research found that: ‘There is a statistically significant negative effect of Aboriginality on the probability of employment. Most of the difference in the employment probabilities between Aborigines and non-Aborigines cannot be explained by the standard human capital variables but rather by factors associated with Aboriginality’. ABS and National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Survey: Employment outcomes for Indigenous Australians, ABS Cat. No. 4199.0, ABS, Canberra, 1996.

74 See summary of reasons for Indigenous disadvantage in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social Justice Report 2000, op.cit, pp9-10.

75 See Fincher, R, and Saunders, P, op.cit , p20ff for discussion of the spatial concentration of disadvantaged in Australia.

76 See Martin, D, op.cit, p34 and Altman, J, op.cit, p128-9. Altman is writing in relationship to the prospects of establishing relationships between government, the business, the community and relationships apropos the McClure Report.

77 Altman, J, ibid, p129-32.

78 Martin, D, op.cit , p34.

79 Altman, J, op.cit , p126.

80 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs, We can do it!: The needs of urban dwelling Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples , Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 2001, paras 7.28-7.32.

81 Saunders, P, op.cit , p27.

82 Miller, M, (Chair), Report of the Committee of Review of Aboriginal Employment and Training Programs , Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1985.

83 ibid , p5.

84 ibid , p9.

85 ibid , p10.

86 Spicer, I, op.cit , p4.

87 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social Justice Report 2000, op.cit , p26. In the Canadian context, the Commissioners for the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples proposed that the application of substantial resources by Government over a twenty-year cycle was necessary to restructure the relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. See Royal Commission into Aboriginal Peoples, Volume 5: Renewal: A twenty year commitment, Minister of Supply and Services , Ottawa, 1996, pp23-24.

88 Hunter, B, and Taylor, J, The job still ahead – Economic costs of continuing Indigenous employment disparity, ATSIC, Canberra, 1998, Executive summary.

89 ibid.

90 Spicer, I, op.cit, p4.

91 ATSIC, ‘ /em>More than Work for the Do m> (Autumn ATSIC News , p 8.

92 Altman, J, ‘The economic status of Indigenous Australians’, CAEPR discussion paper no.193, CAEPR, ANU, Canberra, 2000, p16.

93 For example: ‘A good education affects employment opportunities, which in turn impacts on income levels, access to good housing and health care. Poor health and poor quality housing, in the other hand affect school attendance, the ability to study and ultimately educational outcomes.’ House of Representatives Standing Committee on Family and Community A Health is life: Report on the inquiry into Indigenous health , Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, May 2000, p72. Shortfalls in Indigenous-specific funding will be discussed in Chapter 6.

94 Pearson, N, ‘The Light on the Hill’, Ben Chifley Memorial Lecture, Bathurst Panthers Leagues Club, 12 August 2000, p6-7.

95 ibid.

96 Pearson, N, Our right to take responsibility, op.cit, p22.

97 Pearson, N, ‘On the human right to misery, mass incarceration and early death’, Dr Charles Perkins Memorial Oration, McLaurin Hall, University of Sydney, 25 October 2001, p9.

98 ibid , p12.

99 Elu, J, ‘Indigenous economic empowerment: Fact or fiction Perspective on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander policy , Menzies Research Centre Ltd, Barton, ACT, July 2001, pp19-20.

100 ibid , p21.

101 See for example, Latham, the Hon M, ‘Making welfare work’, in Botsman, P, and Latham, M, The enabling state: People before bureaucracy , Pluto Press, Annandale, N.S.W., 2001, pp115-31 and Abbott, the Hon T, ‘Mutual Obligation and the social fabric’, Bert Kelly Lecture to the Centre for Independent Studies, 3 August 2000.

102 The Partnerships plan forms one response to the Queensland Government’s Ten Year Partnership policy and Queensland Justice Agreement.

103 Ruddock, the Hon P, ‘Aborigines reach a turning point: the public is coming round to practical reconciliation based on individual responsibility’, Age, 23 July 2001, p15.

104 Cited in ‘Reconciliation has to wait, says Pearson Koori mail , 11 July 2001, p5.

105 Pearson, N, ‘On the human right to misery, mass incarceration and early death op.cit , p1.

106 Dodson, P, ‘Beyond the mourning gate – Dealing with unfinished business’, Wentworth lecture 2000, Canberra, 12 May 2000, p14.

107 Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, National Report – Volume 2 , AGPS Canberra, 1991, p377.

108 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Recognition, rights and reform, ATSIC, Canberra, 1995, para 1.8.

109 Altman, J and Sanders, W, From exclusion to dependence – Aborigines and the welfare state in Australia , Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, ANU, Canberra, 1991.

110 Martin, D, op.cit, p 32.

111 ibid.

112 See Rowse, T, ‘McClure’s “Mutual obligation” and Pearson’s “reciprocity” – can they be reconciled?’, paper for the Academy of the Social Sciences workshop: ‘Mutual obligation and welfare states in transition’, University of Sydney, 22-23 February 2001.

113 Martin, D, op.cit , p32.

114 Hunter, B, ‘Social exclusion, social capital, and Indigenous Australians: Measuring the social costs of unemployment’, discussion paper no.204, CAEPR, Canberra, 2000, p2.

115 ATSIC, ‘Social Welfare Reform: ATSIC Submissi op.cit , p.7.

116 Smith, D, quoted in ATSIC, ‘More than Work for the Dole op.cit, p 17

117 Schwab, R, ‘The calculus of reciprocity: Principles and implications of Aboriginal sharing’, CAEPR discussion paper no.110, CAEPR, Canberra, 1995, pp.15-16, quoted in Rowse, T, ‘Representing the two culturesof Indigenous poverty’, SPRC Conference paper, 4 July 2001, p4.

118 Martin, D, op.cit , p7.

119 Peters-Little, F, ‘The community game: Aboriginal self-definition at the local level’, AIATSIS research discussion paper no.10, (10 November 2000), pp12-13.

120 ibid, pp17-18.

121 ibid , p18.

122 ibid.

123 Dudgeon, P, Abdullah, J, Humphries, R, and Walker, R, Social capital and increasing Aboriginal participation in mainstream courses: Weaving the threads of social fabric or spinning another yarn , Centre for Aboriginal Studies, Curtin University of Technology, Perth, 1998, p 5, quoted in Hunter, B, op.cit , p25.

124 Fletcher, C, ‘Aboriginal regional Australia: The hidden dimension of community governance,’ Regional Australia Summit paper, Parliament House, Canberra, 27-29 October 1999, p2.

125 ibid , p1.

126 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Social Justice Commissioner and Acting Race Discrimination Commissioner, Review of the 1994 Water Report , HREOC, Sydney, 2001, pp 71-2.

127 ATSIC, Directions for change, op.cit , p1.

128 ibid.

129 ibid, p3.

130 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social Justice Report 2000, op.cit, p88.