The reference to human rights and fundamental freedoms in s 9(1) includes the rights contained in ICERD: RDA, s 9(2). However, s 9(1) is not limited to ICERD rights. It includes, for example, ‘the complex of rights and freedoms the enjoyment of which permits each member of a society equally with all other members of that society to live in full dignity, to engage freely in any public activity and to enjoy the public benefits of that society’: Gerhardy v Brown
(1985) 159 CLR 70, 125-6 (Brennan J), see also 101-2 (Mason CJ).
 See, eg, Bell v ATSIC  HREOCA 25, at p 49: ‘I am also of the view that this conduct of Mr. Harry Brandy had both the purpose and effect of impairing the equal exercise by Mr. Bell of his right to work, and to just and favourable conditions of work . A work situation in which employees are impeded from going about their ordinary duties by attacks founded on their race is clearly not one in which they are able to enjoy on an equal footing their human right to work and to just and favourable conditions of such work.’ See also Vella v Department of Employment, Vocational Education, Training & Industrial Relations (QLD)  HREOCA 22, at p 27, finding that a racially hostile work environment impairs the right to just and favourable conditions of work.
 See, eg, R Delgado, ‘Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets and Name-Calling’ (1982) 17 Harvard Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law Review 133, esp at 136-49; Mari Matsuda, ‘Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story’ (1989) 87 Michigan Law Review 2320, esp at 2336 n. 84 and 2326-40; Patricia Williams, ‘Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the Law’s Response to Racism’ (1987) 42 University of Miami Law Review 127.
 Ibid (Delgado), p 135-6.
 Page 6, citing Kordos v. Plumrose (Australia) Limited (1989) EOC 92-256. See also Bachleda v Associated Steamships P/L t/a ASP Ship Management and Piesik  HREOCA 48 (25 August 1997).
 The facts of De Souza are also distinguishable, as the complainant unintentionally overheard the relevant racist remark. This was of some significance in the reasoning of the Court of Appeal, which held that the employer could not be said to have ‘treated’ her less favourably within the meaning of s 1 of the Race Relations Act 1976 (UK) unless she was intended to overhear or become aware of the remark:  ICR 514, 524.
 See eg Australian Medical Council v Wilson & Ors (1996) 68 FCR 46, 48 [C] (Black CJ); Baird v State of Queensland (2006) 156 FCR 451 (FC), 467-8 - (Allsop J).